Market Bubbles and Wasteful Avoidance: Tax and Regulatory Constraints on Short Sales by Powers, Michael R. et al.
Columbia Law School 
Scholarship Archive 
Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 
2004 
Market Bubbles and Wasteful Avoidance: Tax and Regulatory 
Constraints on Short Sales 
Michael R. Powers 
David M. Schizer 
Columbia Law School, david.schizer@law.columbia.edu 
Martin Shubik 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Internet Law Commons, Law and Economics Commons, and the Tax Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michael R. Powers, David M. Schizer & Martin Shubik, Market Bubbles and Wasteful Avoidance: Tax and 
Regulatory Constraints on Short Sales, 57 TAX L. REV. 233 (2004). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/945 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more 
information, please contact cls2184@columbia.edu. 
Market Bubbles and Wasteful
Avoidance: Tax and Regulatory
Constraints on Short Sales
MICHAEL R. POWERS,* DAVID M. SCHIZER,**
AND MARTIN SHUBIK***
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, a speculative bubble in Internet stocks has burst
and several "blue chip" firms have failed amidst high profile allega-
tions of corporate misconduct. Why did high-tech start-ups with no
earnings attain such lofty valuations? Why didn't sophisticated inves-
tors keep prices at saner levels? And why didn't more sophisticated
investors look past accounting gimmicks much earlier to uncover
problems at Enron and other firms? More generally, why did the
mechanisms of market efficiency prove inadequate?' While there ob-
viously is no single answer to these complex questions, this Article
focuses on one piece of the problem: U.S. tax and regulatory rules
raise the cost of betting against the market, making it more costly for
sophisticated investors to police the markets in this way. A short sale
is the standard way to bet that publicly traded stock will decline in
value. The seller sells stock that she does not own, hoping to purchase
it later for a lower price. To implement this bet, the seller borrows
* Professor and Director, Advanta Center for Financial Services Studies, Temple
University.
** Dean and Lucy G. Moses Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. Dean Schizer
gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the Milton Handler Research Fellows
Program. We appreciate comments from Jack Coffee, Mel Eisenberg, Victor Fleischer,
Victor Goldberg, Jeff Gordon, Zohar Goshen, George Yin, and Larry Zelenak, as well as
comments received at workshops at Columbia Law School and the University of Virginia
Law School.
*** Seymour H. Knox Professor of Mathematical Institutional Economics, Yale
University, Department of Economics.
1 For a discussion of the factors that can create or limit market efficiency, including an
analysis of the role of the distribution of information in the capital markets, see Ronald J.
Gilson & Reiner H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 Va. L. Rev. 549(1984). The Journal of Corporate Law recently published a symposium about what has
been learned in the 20 years since Gilson and Kraakman published their pathbreaking
article. Ronald J. Gilson & Reiner H. Kraakman, Symposium: Revisiting the Mechanisms
of Market Efficiency: The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The
Hindsight Bias, 28 J. Corp. L. 715 (2003) [hereinafter Hindsight].
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stock (or, to be precise, the seller's broker borrows it).2 Although
short sales serve an important function in financial markets, they face
legal constraints that do not govern long positions.
While others have criticized these constraints, these commentators
have not focused rigorously enough on the precise contours of current
law. Some short sale constraints are mischaracterized 3 and others are
omitted entirely, such as the higher tax rate on short sales.4 Likewise,
the existing literature neglects many strategies that enable well-ad-
vised investors to circumvent these constraints. This avoidance proba-
bly reduces the impact of short sale constraints on market prices, but
contributes to social waste in other ways.
To fill these gaps in the literature, this Article provides a careful
look at existing law, drawing on the economics of capital markets and
public finance. We offer three conclusions. First, short sales play a
valuable role in the financial markets; while there may be plausible
reasons to regulate them-most notably, concerns about market ma-
nipulation and panics-current law is poorly tailored to these goals.
Second, investor self-help can mitigate some of the harm from this
poor tailoring, but at a cost. Third, relatively straightforward reforms
can eliminate the need for such self-help while accommodating legiti-
mate regulatory goals.
A further contribution of this Article is its focus on a burden that
other commentators have neglected: Profits from short sales gener-
ally are ineligible for the reduced tax rate on long-term capital gains,
even if the short sale is in place for more than one year. Although this
differential tax treatment of short sales is ill advised, the case is more
nuanced than it seems at first blush. For example, the difference in
tax rates will not discourage (or even affect) some short sellers. In
2 For instance, assume the short sale occurs on January 1, when the stock price is $100.
If the stock declines to $40 on June 1, the short seller can cover the short by buying shares
for $40 and returning the stock to the lender, netting a $60 per share profit. She buys the
stock for $40 and sells it for $100, albeit in reverse order. This Article focuses on legal
rules governing the short sales of equities, but other assets also can be sold short, including
bonds, currency, and commodities.
3 For instance, several commentators focus on the fact that short sellers must pledge the
short sale proceeds as collateral, and cannot earn a return on these funds. Douglas W.
Diamond & Robert E. Verrecchia, Constraints on Short-Selling and Asset Price Adjust-
ment to Private Information, 18 J. Fin. Econ. 277, 292-97 (1987); Stephen Figlewski, The
Informational Effects of Restrictions on Short Sales: Some Empirical Evidence, 16 J. Fin.
& Quantitative Analysis 463, 469 (1981); Edward M. Miller, Risk, Uncertainty, and Diver-
gence of Opinion, 32 J. Fin. 1151, 1160 (1977). Yet many commentators fail to mention
that hedge funds and institutional investors typically can negotiate for a return on these
funds. See note 11 and accompanying text.
4 The only exception is Patricia M. Dechow, Amy P. Hutton, Lisa Meulbroek & Richard
G. Sloan, Short-Sellers, Fundamental Analysis, and Stock Returns, 61 J. Fin. Econ. 77, 80
(2001). The authors mention the tax rule in passing.
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addition, some of the justifications for a reduced capital gains rate ap-
ply more comfortably to longs than they do to shorts.
This Article proceeds as follows. Section II offers a general discus-
sion of the effect of short sale constraints on market efficiency. In
many cases these constraints will be harmful, but in others they could
have no effect and could even prove helpful. Much depends on the
precise scope of the short sale constraint at issue. Is it narrowly tai-
lored to legitimate regulatory goals? To answer this question, Sections
III and IV turn to current law, considering three legal burdens that
apply to short sales but not to long positions 5 ("short-specific con-
straints"). In addition to the tax differential between longs and shorts,
we offer a brief discussion of the "uptick" rule and "locate require-
ment."' 6 We show that these three burdens are not narrowly tailored
to the concerns identified in Section II, and should be repealed. Sec-
tion V provides our recommendations, including a proposal that addi-
tional disclosure should accompany certain large short sales. Section
VI is the conclusion.
II. COMPETING EFFICIENCY EFFECTS OF SHORT SALE CONSTRAINTS
This Section surveys the positive contributions of short sales, as well
as the policy concerns they raise. The purpose is to determine when
legal constraints on short sales are efficient, and when they are not.
A. Reasons Why Short Sale Constraints May Prove Costly
This Subsection develops the familiar point that short sale con-
straints can prove costly because short sales generally contribute to
market efficiency, whether the market operates rationally or is domi-
nated by noise traders.
1. Unimportance in a Perfectly Functioning Market
We begin with the assumption that markets function rationally, al-
though there is an irony in beginning here: If markets were perfectly
5 We use the term "long" to describe a bet that the market will rise, including the acqui-
sition of an asset or of a derivative that simulates such ownership.
6 While the "tick" test and locate requirement have been the subject of scholarly atten-
tion, the tax treatment of short sales has not. See, e.g., Gene D'Avolio, The Market for
Borrowing Stock, 66 J. Fin. Econ. 271, 275 (2002) (discussing the locate requirement); Dia-
mond & Verrecchia, note 3, at 279, 287-92 (discussing tick test); Jonathan R. Macey, Mark
Mitchell & Jeffry Netter, Restrictions on Short Sales: An Analysis of the Uptick Rule and
its Role in View of the October 1987 Stock Market Crash, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 799 (1989)
(focusing on tick test); Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and
Private Ordering in the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 Duke L. J. 701, 730 (1999) (men-
tioning tick test).
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complete, as the general equilibrium (GE) model posits, short sales
would be unnecessary-and so would all trading of shares.7 Without
transaction costs, asymmetric information, taxes, or other imperfec-
tions, currency would be unnecessary and credit would be uncon-
strained. The only financial instruments would be bundles of
contingent goods. 8 As market actors would have to satisfy only one
budget constraint at the end of time, they could simply borrow in the
interim, instead of selling their bundles. At the end of the game, in-
come from the bundles would precisely offset the borrowing.
This unrealistic scenario suggests two methodological limitations of
the GE model that obscure the value of short sales. First, the model
finesses cash-flow constraints by implicitly positing perfect trust. Sec-
ond, the model assumes that parties' expectations are consistent (or
"rational"). We relax these assumptions to highlight the importance
of short sales in a well-functioning market.
2. Life Cycles and Liquidity
Once credit constraints require individuals to minimize their bor-
rowing, trading in financial assets becomes necessary as current con-
sumers sell financial assets to future consumers. Theoretically, short
sales could serve as substitutes for borrowing if the seller immediately
gained access to sale proceeds. Yet short sellers generally must leave
these funds on deposit with their stock lender.9 While other commen-
7 We distinguish among: (1) new issues and the second-hand stock market, (2) multi-
stage general equilibrium with complete markets or incomplete markets, (3) "rational" and
other expectations, (4) the roles of expertise and perception, and (5) the roles of asymmet-
ric taxes and transaction costs. We concentrate on the second-hand market for items (2),
(3), (4), and (5), and omit discussion of new issues, except for a brief discussion in Subsec-
tion III.D.1.
8 The general equilibrium model typically assumes such perfect conditions. It posits: a
set I of individuals, i = 1, 2,..., n,; a set J of firms, j = 1, 2,... nj (each of which issues
shares so that individuals own firms); a set G of basic goods, g = 1, 2 .. nG; a set S of
states of nature, s = 1, 2,..., ns; and a set T of time periods, t = 1, 2 ... n1. To avoid
accounting for time or uncertainty, the commodity set is enlarged to include as many as
nGnsnT commodities. These new or synthetic commodities combine a basic commodity
with a state and an age. For example, the basic commodity "wheat" may be replaced by a
set that includes, inter alia, two distinct commodities: two-year-old wheat in a period when
the weather is good and two-year-old wheat in a period when the weather is bad. As
Debreu and others showed, this somewhat tortuous abstraction of the economy, complete
with all futures markets, is sufficient to demonstrate the existence of an efficient price
equilibrium. See Gerard Debreu, Theory of Value: An Axiomatic Analysis of Economic
Equilibrium (1959).
9 Short sellers in U.S. capital markets must deposit cash proceeds from short sales as
collateral with the stock lender (that is, the party that lent stock to the short seller). See
Federal Reserve Board Regulation T, 12 C.F.R. 220.12 (2004). A further requirement,
which does not apply to broker-dealers selling short for their own accounts, is to deposit
additional margin: generally 50% of the stock's initial fair market value. Id. The NYSE
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tators often criticize this short sale constraint because it supposedly
keeps short sellers from earning a return on these funds, 10 the reality
is not so unfavorable. Although retail investors earn no return, hedge
funds and other institutional investors typically negotiate for a so-
called "rebate.""1 Even so, short sales are not a pervasive source of
liquidity, if only because they are risky; the amount to be repaid varies
with the underlying stock price.12
3. Speculation, Inconsistent Expectations, and Spanning the
Market
Aside from liquidity, the main rationale for trading financial assets
in the secondary market-and, indeed, for selling short-is to place a
bet.13 Obviously, there is little point in betting-whether the bet is a
long or a short-if everyone has the same information, preferences,
and expectations. So, again, simplifying assumptions about market
behavior, such as the idea that all information is evenly disseminated,
obscure the importance of short selling and thus of short-sale
constraints. 14
also requires more margin as the stock appreciates. See NYSE Rule 431, 2 New York
Stock Exchange Guide (CCH) 2431, at 3751 (Nov. 2003). Sophisticated investors some-
times can circumvent the margin rules. For instance, instead of a short sale, an investor
who satisfies the minimum asset requirements for over-the-counter derivatives could enter
into a prepaid forward. For a discussion, see David M. Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on
Tax Planning, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1312, 1349-53, 1401-02 (2001) [hereinafter Frictions].
10 See note 3.
11 Dechow et al., note 4, at 80; Clarence C.Y. Kwan, Optimal Portfolio Selection Under
Institutional Procedures for Short Selling, 19 J. Banking & Fin. 871, 872 (1995).
12 An exception is a form of so-called convertible arbitrage. Hedge funds in effect fi-
nance the purchase of convertible bonds by short-selling the underlying stock (thereby
earning a rebate on short sale proceeds that nearly covers their borrowing cost). The short
sale and convertible bond are economically offsetting (as long as the portfolio is dynami-
cally rebalanced), and the hedge fund earns a positive spread because the coupon on the
convertible bond exceeds the net borrowing cost. For a description of coupon stripping,
see William M. Gentry & David M. Schizer, Frictions and Tax-Motivated Hedging: An
Empirical Exploration of Publicly-Traded Exchangeable Securities, 56 Nat'l Tax J. 167,
186-87 (2003).
13 In this context investors are functioning as traders, who are willing to be on either
side of the market, depending on price. Of course, few consumers have either the time or
desire to short coffee, butter, or their houses when they feel that prices are too high.
Knowledge, experience, training, and habit introduce considerable asymmetries among ec-
onomic agents. But in the financial markets, with their low transaction costs and high
liquidity, economic agents are more likely to function as traders.
14 John Lintner, The Aggregation of Investor's [sic] Diverse Judgments and Preferences
in Purely Competitive Security Markets, 4 J. Fin. & Quantitative Analysis 347 (1969) (ar-
guing that short-sale constraints do not matter if all traders share the same assessment of
price and risk). Indeed, the capital asset pricing model generally presumes that expecta-
tions are homogeneous and that the market portfolio is mean-variance efficient, such that
every trader holds a market portfolio containing the same proportion of each security. On
these assumptions, short sales are unnecessary. But once trader preferences are not homo-
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Short sales enable market pessimists to optimize their portfolios.15
Indeed, short sales can be an important element of a diversified port-
folio because they tend to appreciate during market declines, thereby
reducing a portfolio's market exposure. 16 Shorts are needed not only
for bets against the market, but also for market-making, hedges, and
bets about volatility-transactions that are not inherently pessimistic
about market prices. For example, specialists engage in short sales in
order to provide liquidity. 17 When securities dealers supply put op-
tions to clients-transactions that clients might use as hedges for ex-
isting positions or as bets that the market will decline-the dealers
typically hedge these derivatives by engaging in short sales.18 In an-
other example, convertible arbitrageurs often use the combination of
convertible bonds and short sales of the underlying stock as bets on
the volatility of the underlying stock.19 "Risk" arbitrageurs bet that a
geneous, short-sale constraints matter. Miller, note 3; Stephen A. Ross, The Capital Asset
Pricing Model (CAPM), Short-Sale Restrictions and Related Issues, 32 J. Fin. 177 (1977).
Cf. Chunchi Wu, Qiang Li & K.C. John Wei, Incomplete-Information Capital Market
Equilibrium With Heterogeneous Expectations and Short Sale Restrictions, 7 Rev. Quanti-
tative Fin. & Acct. 119 (1996) (arguing that short sale restrictions can improve mean vari-
ance inefficiency of market portfolio by "reducing the opportunity cost of ignorance;" since
traders cannot necessarily use information that they uncover, they face less of a disadvan-
tage in passively holding the market portfolio instead).
15 Miller, note 3, is the seminal paper on this point.
16 This negative beta is the rationale for "pairs" or "long-short" trading, a strategy that
many hedge funds use. Kwan, note 11, at 871. Cf. Frans A. De Roon, Theo E. Nijman &
Bas J.M. Werker, Testing for Mean-Variance Spanning With Short Sales Constraints and
Transaction Costs: The Case of Emerging Markets, 56 J. Fin. 721, 733-38 (2001) (while
adding emerging market stocks to a portfolio generally is thought to improve mean vari-
ance efficiency of market portfolio, these benefits do not materialize when short sales are
constrained in emerging markets).
17 In an example of market-making, if a flurry of buy orders come in, the specialist will
fill them with a short position and then will cover the shorts within a brief time, profiting
from the commission spread more than the price change. Anand K. Bhattacharya &
George W. Gallinger, Causality Tests of Short Sales on the New York Stock Exchange, 14
J. Fin. Res. 277 (1991) (finding empirical support for idea that specialists short as market
rises and cover as market falls, such that their short selling activity has no informational
content).
18 Specifically, dealers engage in so-called "dynamic" hedging. They compute the
"delta" of the derivative-that is, the number of cents by which the derivative's value
changes for each dollar change in the underlying property's value. For instance, assume
that the dealer's short put position declines by 80 cents for each dollar of decline in the
stock price. Given this delta of .80, the dealer's hedge will be based on 80% of the posi-
tion. For instance, if the put is for 1000 shares, the dealer will short 800 shares. Since the
delta of an option changes with the stock price, the size of the hedge will change con-
stantly. For a discussion of dynamic hedging, see Schizer, Frictions, note 9, at 1372-77.
19 In buying a convertible bond, the arbitrageur in effect buys a call option and makes a
loan. With a short sale, the arbitrageur in effect can finance the position (thus canceling
out the loan), while hedging the option. To be precise, the short sale hedges the option
against changes in the price of the underlying stock (assuming the size of the short sale is
constantly adjusted, as noted in the prior note). Yet the short sale does not necessarily
hedge against changes in the volatility of the underlying stock. Thus, this "hedged" posi-
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merger will go through by shorting the acquirer and buying the tar-
get.20 In facilitating various bets,21 short sales play a valuable role in
completing financial markets. 22
Not only do short sales help individual traders, but, perhaps even
more importantly, they generate positive externalities by making
prices more accurate. Thus, short sales discipline corporate managers
and allocate resources more efficiently. 23 It is well understood that
tion enables a convertible arbitrageur to place bets on volatility. For a discussion, see
Gentry & Schizer, note 12, at 185-86. For discussion of another convertible arbitrage strat-
egy, coupon stripping, see note 12.
20 Dechow et al., note 4, at 81. In addition, investors who hold highly appreciated secur-
ities and feel undiversified may engage in tax-motivated hedging that simulates a sale but
does not trigger tax; as one of us has written elsewhere, though, these tax-motivated strate-
gies often are a source of social waste. See generally Schizer, Frictions, note 9; see also
Averil Brent, Dale Morse & E. Kay Stice, Short Interest: Explanations and Tests, 25 J. Fin.
& Quantitative Analysis 273 (1990) (finding that a significant proportion of short sales is
associated with tax deferral efforts, hedging, and arbitrage that is not information-based).
Tax-motivated traders can be information-based if the taxpayer expects the stock to de-
cline in value, but in many cases the taxpayer has no view on the stock's future and merely
feels undiversified. In the wake of a 1997 tax reform, IRC § 1259, tax-motivated hedging
generally relies on derivatives instead of short sales, but the providers of these derivatives,
securities dealers, typically engage in short sales to hedge their own positions.
21 To what extent does empirical evidence indicate that short sales are vehicles for plac-
ing bets? Although short selling constitutes a small part of total trade-ranging from 3%
to 10.5% of total trading, as indicated by Table 2-mere quantity does not signify impor-
tance. Especially in rising markets, one would not expect heavy shorting, except to correct
overly sanguine expectations.
TABLE 2
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Shares 39.7 45.3 51.4 66.9 73.4 87.2 104.6 133.3 169.7 203.9
Shorts 3.5 4.1 3.9 5.0 5.8 7.1 9.2 12.8 17.8 20.6
Volume of reported share trading and short sales on the NYSE in billions of shares. NYSE
Fact Book, 91, 101 (1999).
Short selling is a common practice of two distinct groups, as suggested by Table 3, which
contrasts short selling of stock by members of the NYSE and others. Members, who have
accounted for 50% to 65% of the volume, often engage in short sales as part of market-
making efforts (though sometimes they do so as part of trading or arbitrage strategies). In
contrast, private shorts are likely to be more speculative in nature.
TABLE 3
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Members 2.2 2.7 2.7 3.2 3.6 3.8 4.6 6.9 9.8 11.6
Others 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.8 2.2 3.3 4.6 5.9 8.0 9.0
Volume of short trading on the NYSE in billions of shares. Id. at 101.
22 For a discussion of the economic significance of completing markets, see Martin
Shubik, The Theory of Money and Financial Institutions (1999).
23 For instance, in a study of 47 countries, some of which allow short sales and some of
which do not, Bris, Goetzmann and Zhu find more cross-sectional variation in equity re-
turns in markets where short selling is feasible and practiced. As a result, they conclude
that short sales enhance price discovery, while short-sale constraints impede this process.
Arturo Bris, William N. Goetzmann & Ning Zhu, Efficiency and the Bear: Short Sales and
Markets Around the World 2-3 (Yale ICF Working Paper No. 02-45, 2003), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=357800. For other empirical studies
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excluding the short seller may undermine this benefit by slowing the
market's progress toward an equilibrium price. If pessimists cannot
trade, optimists are likely to have a disproportionate influence on
prices.24
4. The Contribution of Short Sales in a Market With Noise Traders
Short sales can be especially important if "noise traders" have sig-
nificant influence over the market. 25 A noise trader pays insufficient
attention to a financial asset's real value, instead trading on market
momentum, unsound theories, inaccurate information, and the like.
Thus, if noise traders dump a stock (or sell it short), the market could
decline steeply unless sophisticated traders go long. Likewise, if noise
traders bid up an asset price, a bubble is averted only if sophisticated
investors sell short.26
showing the negative effects of short-sale constraints on market efficiency, see notes 37, 38,
and 42.
24 Miller proposed this idea in an influential paper that applies the "winner's curse" to a
market with short-sale constraints. Miller, note 3; see also Lintner, note 14, at 386 (model-
ing idea that" if traders have heterogeneous expectations, short-sale constraints raise the
market price of risk); Michael J. Harrison & David M. Kreps, Speculative Investor Behav-
ior in a Stock Market With Heterogeneous Expectations, 92 Q.J. Econ. 323 (1978) (model-
ing effect of short-sale constraints on price in market with speculators); Laurence Carassus
& Elyes Jouini, Investment and Arbitrage Opportunities With Short Sale Constraints, 8
Math. Fin. 169 (1998) (offering formal proof that short sale constraints render arbitrage
impossible even in a frictionless economy in which all assets have negative present value);
Franklin Allen, Stephen Morris & Andrew Postelwaite, Finite Bubbles With Short Sale
Constraints and Asymmetric Information, 61 J. Econ. Theory 206 (1993) (modeling specu-
lative bubbles and arguing that short-sale constraints are precondition); Eli Ofek & Mat-
thew Richardson, DotCom Mania: The Rise and Fall of Internet Stock Prices, 58 J. Fin.
1113 (2003) (using model of heterogeneous expectations and short-sale constraints to ex-
plain Internet bubble). In response to Miller, Robert Jarrow proposed a circumstance in
which easing short-sale constraints may cause some prices to rise, instead of falling (as
Miller predicted). Jarrow's claim depends on the premise that short sales can be used as a
source of financing; the idea is that some traders will be able to buy more of a stock (and
thus will drive up its price) if they can finance the purchase by shorting other stocks. Rob-
ert Jarrow, Heterogeneous Expectations, Restrictions on Short Sales, and Equilibrium As-
set Prices, 35 J. Fin. 1105, 1112 (1980). As noted above, the premise that traders can use
short sales as a source of funding generally does not hold. See text accompanying note 9.
25 For a formal statement of the role of short sales in preventing bubbles, see Appendix
A.
26 For a discussion of the effect of noise traders on stock prices, see J. Bradford De
Long, Andrei Shleifer, Lawrence H. Summers & Robert Waldmann, Noise Trader Risk in
Financial Markets, 98 J. Pol. Econ. 703 (1990). In addition to the noise trader literature,
another literature grounded in behavioral law and economics explores the extent to which
cognitive biases spawn market imperfections. For example, optimism bias may cause trad-
ers to have too much confidence in their own judgment. Yet this bias is not unique to short
sellers. Indeed, we are not aware of any cognitive bias that uniquely impacts short sellers.
Even without cognitive biases or noise traders, moreover, speculative bubbles are still pos-
sible. Rational traders can bid up the price while expecting to sell before the price falls.
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While noise traders could be either long or short, optimistic noise
traders pose a particular threat because, for two reasons, their overly
rosy assessment is less likely to be corrected than an overly pessimistic
view. First, many market "gatekeepers" who monitor managers and
market prices have private incentives to deemphasize negative infor-
mation and, in some cases, to fuel a speculative bubble. For instance,
research analysts are often reluctant to issue sell recommendations be-
cause the downgraded firm might retaliate by withholding underwrit-
ing business from the analyst's investment bank.27 Likewise, auditors
historically have had incentives to cooperate with misleadingly opti-
mistic accounting practices as a way to win consulting business for
their accounting firms.28
Second, while sophisticated short sellers might correct for these
conflicts, the economic fragility of short sales could discourage short
sellers from intervening-a deterrent that is wholly separate from le-
gal burdens unique to short sales. Shorts present the risk of unlimited
losses; unlike the buyer of a long position, who cannot lose more than
the purchase price of the long, a short seller theoretically can lose an
infinite amount as the price rises. 29 Likewise, shorts present only lim-
ited opportunity for gain; unlike a long, which can yield an infinite
profit, a short can yield no more than the short sale proceeds (that is,
the value of the security when it is sold short). In addition, short sell-
ers generally do not have access to these proceeds, so their costs rise
as the short sale remains in place (assuming the short sale rebate does
not provide an adequate return). 30 Finally, whether they are short or
long, arbitrageurs are prone to liquidity constraints and other costs. 31
Their investors typically expect quick results, and may view short-run
Short-sale constraints also are a precondition for this type of bubble. See Allen et al., note
24.
27 For a discussion of how gatekeepers such as auditors, lawyers and research analysts
may fail to prevent corporate fraud, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's
About the Gatekeepers, Stupid," 57 Bus. Law. 1403 (2002); see also Harrison Hong &
Jeffrey D. Kubik, Analyzing the Analysts: Career Concerns and Biased Earnings Fore-
casts, 58 J. Fin. 313 (2003) (showing that securities analysts are more likely to be promoted
if they offer optimistic assessments, particularly of stocks underwritten by their employers).
28 Provisions of the Sarbanes Oxley legislation targeted these conflicts by barring audi-
tors from selling certain consulting services. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. 78-
1(g)-(m).
29 In response, some short sellers automatically cover after a stock rises by a stated
amount, such as 25%. Lewis Braham, The Art of Selling Short, Bus. Wk., Aug. 5, 2002, at
104.
30 Bruce Tuckman & Jean-Luc Vila, Arbitrage With Holding Costs: A Utility-Based
Approach, 47 J. Fin. 1283, 1285 (1992).
31 For an estimation of various costs of arbitrage, including the risk that markets will not
converge, the cost of borrowing stock to sell short, the cost of posting margin, and the like,
see Mark Mitchell, Todd Pulvino & Erik Stafford, Limited Arbitrage in Equity Markets, 57
J. Fin. 551, 564-76 (2002); see also Ofek & Richardson, note 24, at 1118-20 (explaining why
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unprofitability as a mark of incompetence. As a result, arbitrageurs
are likely to underinvest in long-term bets that could prove unprofita-
ble in the short run.32 Likewise, they know they may leave their cur-
rent job, and thus may no longer be managing the portfolio when the
long-term bet pays off.33 Given these built-in obstacles to market-cor-
recting short sales, legal constraints on short sales could prove all the
more harmful.34
B. Reasons Why Short-Sale Constraints May Be Unimportant
Thus far, we have shown that short sales play a vital role in optimiz-
ing individual portfolios and policing market prices, whether the mar-
ket functions rationally or is dominated by noise traders. Yet for two
reasons, it does not follow that the short-sale constraints under cur-
rent law are necessarily inefficient. First, these constraints may have
no effect on market prices because the market has adjusted to them,
or because they are easy to avoid. Second, even if the constraints do
have an effect on market prices or individual portfolios, the con-
straints may serve a valuable function that offsets the distortions dis-
cussed above. These possibilities are developed in the following
Subsections.
1. Sophisticated Investors Adjust Their Expectations
While short-sale constraints may prevent pessimists from optimizing
their individual portfolios, they do not distort market prices if the
owners of overvalued securities pick up the slack. For instance, as-
sume that Sarah the short seller has negative information about a
stock. Does it matter if a legal rule keeps Sarah from selling short?
Assuming that Larry, the owner of a long position, has the same infor-
mation and thus decides to sell, excluding Sarah from the market is
less likely to distort prices (though it will keep Sarah from optimizing
mutual and hedge funds were reluctant to short Internet stocks, and why they faced high
costs in doing so).
32 For a description of how arbitrageurs may be forced out of positions when markets
fail to converge in the short term, see Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Limits of
Arbitrage, 52 J. Fin. 35 (1997). In addition, arbitrageurs may be tempted in the short run
to trade ahead of the noise traders, instead of trading against them. For example, during a
speculative bubble, arbitrageurs may buy shares with the hope of selling them at a profit to
noise traders before the bubble bursts. See Gilson & Kraakman, Hindsight, note 1, at 733.
33 Eitan Goldman & Steve L. Slezak, Delegated Portfolio Management and Rational
Prolonged Mispricing, 58 J. Fin. 283 (2003).
34 Indeed, a recent study reports that 70% of mutual funds are prohibited by their char-
ters from selling short. Andres Almazen, Keith C. Brown, Murray Carlson, David A.
Chapman, Why Constrain Your Mutual Fund Manager?, J. Fin. Econ. (forthcoming), avail-
able at http://jfe.rochester.edu/03140.pdf, at 8-9.
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her portfolio).35 Market prices are unaffected, however, only if the
longs learn what the shorts know and interpret the common informa-
tion in the same way.36 We should be careful about this assumption
because, in many cases, expectations are inconsistent and information
is unevenly disseminated; indeed, empirical studies show that short
sellers often have superior information 37 and that mispriced securities
are more likely to be overvalued than to be undervalued.38
Even if longs do not learn what the shorts know (or would have
uncovered), short-sale constraints still would not distort prices if the
longs adjusted their valuations to account for the exclusion of shorts
from the market.39 Yet any estimates of this missing volume are im-
precise.40 In addition, changes in short-sale volume are a noisy signal
because spikes in short-sale volume do not necessarily connote market
pessimism (that is, since short sales are used to bet on market volatil-
35 Likewise, excluding Sarah from selling short seems less harmful if Sarah can sell a
different security that she owns, and this security tends to correlate in value with the secur-
ity she would like to short. Jarrow, note 24, at 1109. This theory is less reassuring to the
extent that firm-specific risks do not correlate in this way.
36 See Milton Harris & Artur Raviv, Differences of Opinion Make a Horse Race, 6 Rev.
Fin. Stud. 473 (1993) (certain empirical market regularities may be explained if we assume
that investors draw different inferences from the same information).
37 Charles M. Jones & Owen A. Lamont, Short-Sale Constraints and Stock Returns, 66
J. Fin. Econ. 207 (2002) (using early 20th century U.S. data to show that stocks that are
expensive to short have high valuations and low subsequent returns); Dechow et al., note 4,
at 87 (finding that high short interest is a strong indicator of poor future performance);
Paul Asquith & Lisa Meulbroek, An Empirical Investigation of Short Interest (Harvard
Bus. Sch., Working Paper 96-012, 1995) (on file with the Tax Law Review) (detecting
strong negative relation, during the period 1976-93, between short interest and subsequent
returns); A.J. Senchack, Jr. & Laura T. Starks, Short-Sale Restrictions and Market Reac-
tion to Short-Interest Announcements, 28 J. Fin. and Quantitative Analysis 177 (1993)
(showing that unexpected increase in short interest on nonoptioned stocks leads to nega-
tive returns); Chen et al., note 34 (using narrow share ownership as proxy for difficulty of
selling short, and showing that narrow share ownership predicts abnormal negative returns
during period from 1979 to 1998). But cf. J. Randall Woolridge & Amy Dickinson, Short
Selling and Common Stock Prices, Fin. Analysts J. 50-1, at 20 (1994) (finding that increase
in short interest corresponds with small but statistically insignificant increase in price).
While Woolridge and Dickinson's result is an outlier, Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek and
Sloan attribute the discrepancy to the fact that the former chose stocks at random, whereas
the latter chose stocks with a short interest that is above a specified threshold. As a result,
they avoid stocks in which short interest is a product of liquidity trading instead of infor-
mation-based trading. Dechow et al., note 4, at 81, 87.
38 For instance, using price earnings ratios and the level of firm repurchases and issu-
ances of new stock, Finn, Fuller, and Kling identified a portfolio of undervalued stocks and
a portfolio of overvalued stocks. The undervalued securities modestly outperformed the
market while the overvalued securities dramatically underperfomed. They concluded,
therefore, that mispricing is "mostly on the short side." Mark T. Finn, Russell J. Fuller &
John L. Kling, Equity Mispricing: It's Mostly on the Short Side, Fin. Analysts J. 55-6, at
117 (1999).
39 Diamond & Verrecchia, note 3, at 302.
40 Figlewski, note 3, at 465 (average discounting will be incorrect).
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ity, the success of mergers, and the like). 41 Not surprisingly, empirical
evidence shows that short-sale constraints do indeed inflate market
prices.42 In any event, even if market actors are able to correct for
distortions arising from the above rules, at least to an extent, short
sellers cannot optimize their individual portfolios. In addition, the ef-
forts of market actors to correct for missing short sales are themselves
costly. It would be better to eliminate this costly self-help by crafting
short-sale constraints with greater precision.
2. Constraints May Be Balanced By Offsetting Benefits
Even if traders cannot adjust their valuations, short-sale constraints
can prove unimportant if other factors heighten the appeal of short
sales. A constraint should not deter short sellers if they expect an
offsetting legal benefit. Even if the law penalizes some short sales ex
post (for example, because a penalty applies but a benefit does not),
risk-neutral short sellers should not be discouraged ex ante if the
41 See text accompanying notes 17-20.
42 Bris et al., note 23 (showing that markets that restrict short sales offer less efficient
price discovery); Bartley R. Danielson & Sorin M. Sorescu, Why Do Option Introductions
Depress Stock Prices? A Study of Diminishing Short Sale Constraints, 36 J. Fin. and
Quantitative Analysis 451 (2001) (concluding that the introduction of options trading,
which facilitates short sales, leads to decline in stock price, especially in volatile and high
beta stocks); Joseph K.W. Fung & Li Jiang, Restrictions on Short-Selling and Spot-Futures
Dynamics, 26 J. Bus. Fin. & Acct. 227 (1999) (offering time series data in Hong Kong to
show that relaxing short-sale constraints narrowed gap between spot and futures prices);
Gerald D. Gay & Dae Y. Jung, A Further Look at Transaction Costs, Short Sale Restric-
tions, and Futures Market Efficiency: The Case of Korean Stock Index Futures, 19 J. Fu-
tures Markets 153 (1999) (offering empirical evidence that Korean short-sale constraints
serve to inflate equity prices relative to futures prices, since only the former are subject to
short-sale constraints); Robert A. Jarrow & Maureen O'Hara, Primes and Scores: An Es-
say on Market Imperfections, 44 J. Fin. 1263 (1989) (showing that when financial engineers
divided common stock into primes and scores, the combined value of the pieces exceeded
the value of the stock, and attributing this failure of the no-arbitrage rule to short-sale
constraints); Li Jiang, Joseph K.W. Fung & Louis Cheng, The Lead-Lag Relationship Be-
tween Spot and Futures Markets Under Different Short-Selling Regimes, Fin. Rev. 38-3, at
63 (2001) (same); Alexander Kempf, Short Selling, Unwinding and Mispricing, 18 J. Fu-
tures Markets 903 (1998) (using data from German equity spot and futures markets to
show that short-sale constraints lead to mispricing in the spot market); Owen A. Lamont &
Richard H. Thaler, Can the Market Add and Subtract? Mispricing in Tech Stock Carve-
Outs, 111 J. Pol. Econ. 227 (2003) (observing instances in which the value of stock to be
spun off exceeds the value of the distributing company, such as the spinoff of Palm by
3Com, and explaining these blatant mispricings with short-sale constraints); Eli Ofek, Mat-
thew Richardson & Robert F. Whitelaw, Limited Arbritrage and Short Sales Restrictions:
Evidence From the Options Markets, J. Fin. Econ. (forthcoming), available at http://
jfe.rochester.edu/03238.pdf (offering empirical evidence that short-sale constraints prevent
arbitrage and thus allow stock to be overpriced relative to the underlying options and
showing that this mispricing increases with the strength of the short-sale constraint, as mea-
sured by the size of the short-sale rebate). Cf. Jonathan M. Karpoff, Costly Short Sales and
the Correlation of Returns With Volume, 11 J. Fin. Research 173 (1988) (offering empirical
evidence that short-sale constraints reduce volume in bear market).
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probability and magnitude of the penalty and benefit are comparable.
Thus, these short sellers can still optimize their portfolios and influ-
ence market prices.
3. Sophisticated Investors Avoid the Constraints
Even if there are no offsetting benefits, short-sale constraints
should be less important if market pessimists can avoid them easily.
For instance, if avoidance is costless, all would-be-short sellers can still
sell short, so the constraints should not affect market prices or the
ability of traders to optimize their portfolios. The cost of avoidance is
not so trivial, however, and it probably varies for different constraints
and classes of traders. The existing literature provides very little gui-
dance on this issue. A few commentators mention the public options
market as a way around short-sale constraints, and show that short
interest is greater for optionable stock.43 But this literature does not
give a sense of how costly such avoidance is, except that two commen-
tators suggest it is expensive. 44 The literature does not mention other
methods of avoidance or distinguish among the various constraints.
To begin filling this gap, we describe ways in which well-advised
traders can avoid various short-sale constraints, as well as some limits
on this avoidance. Not surprisingly, the constraints differ in various
ways. A constraint could prove less harmful if it is easier for sophisti-
cated traders to avoid than for noise traders. Yet a constraint will be a
less effective filter if some noise traders can still avoid the constraint,
and if some sophisticated traders are likely to be shut out. The latter
scenarios are especially troubling if the excluded short sellers would
have been marginal (and thus price setting) traders; and, in theory, in
a market with heterogeneous preferences, every trader is marginal as
to the last share she holds or shorts.45 Finally, even if all sophisticated
traders can sell short, this avoidance may be expensive. We do not
offer empirical data on these issues. Yet Sections III and IV lay the
groundwork for such research by offering careful legal analysis and
anecdotal evidence to illuminate the type of avoidance that is possible,
and some of the costs it presents.
43 Stephen Figlewski & Gwendolyn P. Webb, Options, Short Sales, and Market Com-
pleteness, 48 J. Fin. 761 (1993); Senchack & Starks, note 37. Cf. Martin Raab & Robert
Schwarger, Spanning With Short-Selling Restrictions, 48 J. Fin. 791, 792 (1993) (showing
that, in theory, short-sale restrictions do not matter if traders can short an index future).
4 Dechow et al., note 4; Asquith & Meulbroek, note 37 ("Hedge fund managers and
other practitioners involved in short selling maintain that they cannot effectively use the
options market. In interviews, they repeatedly claimed that the options market provides
less liquidity and is more expensive than the short sales market when trying to establish a
large position on a hard to borrow stock.").
45 Lintner, note 14.
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C. Reasons Why Short-Sale Constraints May Be Valuable
We have shown that in some cases short-sale constraints are harm-
ful, and in some cases they are likely to be unimportant. Yet in still
other cases, short-sale constraints could enhance efficiency. This Sub-
section considers when short sales would lead to unappealing results,
so that constraints are useful.
1. Moral Hazard and Panics
By taking a large enough position, a short seller could depress the
price (at least in a thin market), thereby manufacturing profits on the
short as the price declines. Obviously, if this price starts out at too
high a level (for example, because noise traders have bid up the
price), this use of a short sale is not objectionable. But in some cir-
cumstances a short seller could trigger a decline even if the market
price already is at an appropriate level-for instance, by spreading
false rumors. Not only might a sophisticated investor use short sales
in manipulating the market, but, as noted above, noise traders might
use short sales in a way that precipitates or intensifies a panic-that is,
a steep market decline that market fundamentals do not justify.46
While manipulation and noise traders may offer valid rationales for
regulation,47 these justifications are not unique to short sales. Similar
issues arise for long positions.48 For instance, a sophisticated investor
could buy a large block, and then profit as this trade induces unsophis-
ticated investors to buy at higher prices. Likewise, there is no a priori
reason to believe that panics are worse than bubbles. Thus, the
proper regulatory response is to target all manipulative and noise
trading, without singling out short sales.
2. Cascading Defaults
If the stock price rises dramatically after a short sale-so that the
short seller has misjudged the market-it will be expensive for the
short seller to return the stock she has borrowed. If she is unable to
raise the funds, the stock lender will lose her stock, a loss that, for
instance, could keep the stock lender from repaying margin debt.
Preventing such a cascade of defaults by ensuring that shorts can
cover their positions is a plausible rationale for regulation. Yet this
46 Indeed, there is empirical support for the intuitive idea that, in markets that allow
short sales, panics are somewhat more frequent and intense. Bris et al., note 23, at 25.
47 For a disclosure-based regulatory response, see Section V.
48 A difference is that, theoretically, a short seller does not need capital to sell short,
since she is selling borrowed stock; as a practical matter, though, the margin rules operate
to require short sellers to put up capital. See note 9.
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concern is not unique to short sales. There is a similar need to ensure
that a purchaser of securities can repay loans that funded the purchase
price.49 The margin rules and related requirements address these con-
cerns for long positions; they also apply to short sales, and rightly S0.50
Because this regime is not unique to short sales, we do not focus on it
below.
3. Incomplete Markets and Second-Best Concerns
There is no developed market for short sales outside the financial
markets, for instance, in personal property, land, buildings, or human
capital.51 Since there are no short sales of human capital or residential
real property, should there be short sales in the financial markets? If
the absence of short sales causes prices to rise, it may be better to
have this distortion apply across the board.
This is a difficult question because, in theory, partial moves toward
completing the market have ambiguous results; if the market will re-
main incomplete anyway, a partial step toward completion can either
enhance or reduce welfare, depending upon the precise facts (which
typically are not measurable). 52 In the absence of data, we favor a
presumption in favor of incremental steps toward complete markets, if
only because the market otherwise cannot become complete. Thus, in
order to allow markets to become complete, legal impediments to
short selling should be narrowly tailored.
4. Social Waste From Speculation
Short sales arguably share a deficiency that sometimes is attributed
to speculation in general: Since one party's market prediction will be
correct, and the other's will not, speculation is a zero-sum game in
which transaction costs represent social waste. 53 We are skeptical
49 The main difference is that losses on a long position are limited to the purchase price
of the security, while losses on a short sale are theoretically unlimited.
50 See text accompanying notes 9-12.
51 The difference is that financial markets impose lower transaction costs, offer greater
liquidity, and serve as a perception and evaluation device to help resolve inconsistent ex-
pectations. On the last point, even the most resolute fundamental value analyst regards
the economic system at best as "an equilibrium-tending device," rather than a system that
is truly in equilibrium.
52 See Oliver D. Hart, On the Optimality of Equilibrium When the Market Structure Is
Incomplete, 11 J. Econ. Theory 418 (1975); Peter H. Huang, A Normative Analysis of New
Financially Engineered Derivatives, 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 471 (2000).
53 Stout, note 6. In fact, although speculation is a zero-sum game in terms of cash-in
that one party's gain is the other party's loss-it is not necessarily a zero-sum game in
terms of utility. The parties to these bets both improve their utilities, as measured before
they know whether their market prediction was correct. For instance, assume that the
owner of a large undiversified position in Microsoft decides to sell a portion of her posi-
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about this argument because we believe accurate market prices yield
significant positive externalities. In any event, if this concern is valid,
it is not unique to short sales. A legal response (such as a securities
transfer tax, designed to dampen the volume of secondary market
trading) presumably should constrain speculative longs to the same
extent as speculative shorts.
5. Executive Incentives and Insider Trading
Special concerns arise when executives short their employer's stock,
since this transaction might undermine their incentives and serve as a
means of misappropriating the firm's proprietary information through
insider trading.54 These issues are beyond this Article's scope because
we focus on investors as opposed to managers.
6. "Sin," "Unpatriotic" Short Sales, and a Brief Note on Political
Economy
In the popular mind, short sellers sometimes are viewed as unsa-
vory, and even unpatriotic. 55 Long positions are admired as invest-
ments, while short positions are dismissed as speculation. This
perspective is naive. Setting aside the primary market (in which inves-
tors buy securities directly from the firm), 56 any secondary market ac-
tivity-whether it is a long or a short-is a speculative bet. As such, it
can contribute to liquidity and more accurate pricing, thereby enhanc-
ing the primary market's appeal, disciplining corporate managers, and
having useful allocative effects for the rest of the economy.
tion, investing the proceeds in risk-free bonds. If Microsoft continues to appreciate, this
seller has "lost" and the new owner has "won" an offsetting amount of cash. As measured
at the time of the sale (that is, when the future price was unknown), however, both parties
have improved their utility. The seller has reduced her undiversified exposure, while the
buyer has entered into a new bet that he deems desirable.
54 Thus, officers, directors, and certain large shareholders are not permitted to sell short
unless they cover within 20 days. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(c), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78p(a) (1988). In contrast, short positions in derivatives are permitted for hedging (that
is, if the so-called "§ 16 insider" owns as many shares as are the subject of the derivative
short position). See SEC Rule 16c-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16c-4 (2004). These provisions are
outside the scope of this Article. For a discussion, see David M. Schizer, Executives and
Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundation of Incentive Compatibility, 100 Colum. L. Rev.
440 (2000).
55 Nick Evans, Don't Shoot the Short Sellers, 33 Euromoney 20 (2002) (describing view
among general public that "short- sellers are evil people, they have robbed us of our
money and they must be stopped"; also quoting Axa Chairman Claude Bebear's descrip-
tion of short sellers as "'irrational, even immoral"'); Japan Sells Itself Short, 13 Asiamoney
1 (2002) ("'Short sellers are mean-spirited sorts bent on making money by getting a jump
on ordinary investors."') (quoting Japanese finance minister Maajuro Shiokawa).
56 For discussion of the primary market, see Section III.D.1.
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Nevertheless, the "sin" rhetoric can prove helpful to interest groups
that benefit from short-sale constraints. While the political economy
of short-sale constraints is beyond this Article's scope, it should be
noted that managers of publicly traded firms benefit when their em-
ployer's stock rises, and suffer financial injury from "bear raids."'57 In-
flated equity prices also reduce a firm's cost of capital. 58 Likewise,
investment banks and research analysts generally benefit when stock
prices rise. 59
D. Implications for Legal Constraints on Short Sales
We have shown that short selling serves a socially useful function,
whether the market operates rationally or is dominated by noise trad-
ers. Aside from the special case of firm managers, then, regulators
generally should permit short sales to the same extent as longs. Regu-
lation may be needed to prevent market manipulation and panics, but
any constraint on short sales should be narrowly tailored to these con-
cerns and also should apply to long positions. Of course, poor tailor-
ing will not distort market prices as much if market actors can avoid
the constraint, but this self-help can be a separate source of social
waste. The next two Sections identify three legal constraints that sin-
gle out short sales: ineligibility for the reduced tax rate for long-term
capital gains, the uptick rule, and the locate requirement. We ask
whether these rules are narrowly tailored and, if not, whether they are
easy to avoid. In general, we find that these rules are likely to under-
mine market efficiency, and thus should be reconsidered.
III. THE HIGHER TAx ON SHORT SALE PROFITS
This Section evaluates a short-specific constraint that other com-
mentators have overlooked: Unlike gains from long positions, short-
sale gains are not eligible for favorable long-term capital gain tax rates
even if the short sale remains open for more than a year.60 Of course,
one might question whether the tax rate should be reduced for any
long-term capital gain; we do not address this issue. Our point is that,
57 We thank Jack Coffee for this observation.
58 Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Arbitrage, Short Sales, and Financial Innovation, 59
Econometrica 1041 (1991) (short sale constraints protect financial innovators); Miller, note
3.
59 See Section II.A.4. Relatedly, anecdotal evidence suggests that fund managers and
investment banks that profit from rising markets have tried to drive certain professional
short sellers out of business. For a discussion, see Benjamin Mark Cole, The Pied Pipers of
Wall Street: How Analysts Sell You Down the River (2001).
60 For individuals, long-term capital gain generally is taxed at a 15% rate. IRC § 1(h).
Short-term capital gain is taxed at the taxpayer's marginal rate for ordinary income, the
maximum being 35%. See IRC § 1.
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if a reduced rate is offered to long positions, it generally should be
available to short sales on comparable terms. To develop this argu-
ment, we consider three issues: why the higher tax on short sales
might be harmful, why it might not matter, and why it might prove
socially useful.
A. Why the Higher Tax On Short Sales Could Prove Inefficient
To benefit from a reduced rate for capital gains, a taxpayer must
hold the relevant asset for the requisite holding period, which cur-
rently is one year.61 Short sellers are ineligible for this benefit because
of a quirk in the computation of holding period. For a short sale, the
holding period is based not on the length of time that the short sale is
open, but on the time the taxpayer holds the stock that is delivered to
the stock lender to cover the short. 62
As an example, assume that on January 1, 2004, a taxpayer enters
into a short sale of stock for $100 by borrowing the necessary shares
from her broker (the "stock lender"). Two years later, on January 1,
2006, the taxpayer covers the short at a $60 per share gain by purchas-
ing shares for $40 and immediately delivering them to the stock
lender. Even though the short sale lasted for more than a year, the
taxpayer held the stock for only a matter of minutes. As a result, the
taxpayer's gain is treated as short-term.
This rule relies on a formalistic definition of holding period. Al-
though the taxpayer places a two-year bet, the short sale is a liability,
not something that the taxpayer is "holding," and so no "holding" pe-
riod accrues. Rather, the only thing the taxpayer actually "holds" is
the stock purchased to cover the short, and that stock is held only
briefly.63 In effect, the tax law relies on an uneconomic definition of
the relevant transaction, focusing on the asset purchased to cover the
short sale, instead of on the short sale itself.
The bottom line is that, under the current rate structure, 64 individu-
als who bet on market increases generally face a lower long-term tax
61 IRC § 1222(3).
62 See IRC § 1233; Reg. § 1.1233-1(a)(3) ("Generally, the period for which a taxpayer
holds property delivered to close a short sale determines whether long-term or short-term
capital gain or loss results.").
63 Assume, again, that the taxpayer shorts the stock on January 1, 2004, and purchases
stock to cover the short on January 1, 2006. But assume that, instead of actually covering
the short, the taxpayer holds this stock for a year, and covers the short on January 2, 2007.
Although she held the stock for more than one year, the gain is still short-term. Reg.
§ 1.1233-1(c).
64 While there currently is a significant gap between the rate for long-term capital gain
and the rate for short-term capital gain and ordinary income, this gap has been both
broader and narrower at various points in history. For instance, in 1986, when Congress
temporarily repealed the capital gains preference, Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
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rate (15%) than individuals who bet on market declines (short-term
capital gains rates that are approximately 35% in the maximum
bracket). 65 As we argued in the preceding Section, such favoritism for
long positions can prevent individuals from optimizing their portfolios
and can distort market prices.
Nor can this rule be justified as a response to manipulative short
sales. The rule applies to all short sales by individuals, 66 without ask-
ing whether the trader has manipulative intent. Indeed, the rule pe-
nalizes long-term short positions,67 which are less likely than short-
term bets to be involved in manipulative schemes. After all, the mar-
ket is likely to discover the inaccuracy of a manipulative rumor by the
time a position has been in place for a year.68
Instead of treating short sales differently under a formalistic rule, it
would seem advisable to conform with the rule for long positions. To
do so, we would measure the holding period for naked shorts by the
length of time that the short sale is open, and not by the holding pe-
riod of property used to cover the short. Before drawing this conclu-
sion, we consider reasons why this higher tax rate on short sales could
prove unimportant or even useful.
B. Why the Higher Tax on Short Sale Profits Could Prove
Unimportant: Offsetting Tax Benefits From Short-
Sale Losses
There are two reasons why the extra tax burden on short sales
might not distort market prices. First, the tax burden we describe (a
high rate on short-sale gains) is offset, to an extent, by a tax benefit (a
potentially more valuable deduction for short-sale losses). Second,
short sellers sometimes can avoid the higher rate on their gains.
514, § 301(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2216, the tax rate on longs and shorts was comparable. For a
historical survey of the capital gains preference, see David M. Schizer, Realization as Sub-
sidy, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1549, 1601 (1998).
65 For both long and short positions, the tax rates in the text are overstated. Given the
taxpayer's ability to defer recognition of gain, and the tax-reducing effect of deferral, the
effective tax rate is lower for each type of position. The benefits of deferral, however, are
available to both long and short positions. For a discussion of strategic trading, see text
accompanying note 76.
66 For discussion of those who are not covered by the rule, including corporate taxpay-
ers, see Subsection III.B.2.
67 The tax rule's adverse effect falls on long-term traders. Short-term traders-whether
long or short-always will be subject to the higher short-term tax rates. In contrast, long-
term traders can benefit from the reduced tax rate if they buy stock, but not if they sell it
short.
68 Of course, a trader could take a position, wait a year, and then begin spreading ru-
mors, but the trader would have to be exposed to a year's unhedged risk before commenc-
ing manipulative activity, and this extra risk is likely to discourage most would-be
manipulators.
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These alleviating factors, which are discussed in the next two Subsec-
tions, offer some comfort on balance, but are not complete solutions.
1. Two Reasons Why Tax Rates on Risk Can Be Irrelevant
Ironically, a high tax rate is not necessarily unappealing to inves-
tors. While it means the government claims a larger share of gains, it
also means that the government bears a larger share of losses.69 Since
this point is somewhat counterintuitive-after all, don't investors al-
ways prefer a low tax rate?-we begin with two reasons why an inves-
tor might not mind the higher tax rate.70 We then offer three reasons
why the higher rate on short sale profits nevertheless proves to be
unattractive here.
First, a higher tax rate might not discourage short sellers because
they do not know, ex ante, whether they will have gains or losses;
assuming a full deduction for losses is offered-an assumption that we
revisit below-a high rate is better for losses (that is, because the de-
duction is more valuable). As a simple illustration, assume that a long
bet (Long) and a short bet (Short) each generate the same pretax cash
flow: $200 if the bet is successful, and zero if it is not. Assuming suc-
cess and failure are equally likely, a risk-neutral investor would value
either bet at $100.71 This obviously is true if the tax rate is zero, but it
remains true for any other tax rate72 and-notably for our purposes-
it remains true if Long and Short are subject to different tax rates.
Thus, Long is still worth $100 if subject to a 15% tax rate. Compared
with a zero tax rate, the taxpayer is worse off if the bet succeeds
(keeping $185 instead of $200), but better off if it fails (keeping $15
69 It is well understood that the tax rate on risk does not affect the price of risk if full
loss offsets are available-that is, if the government shares in losses to the same extent that
it shares in gains. See, e.g., Evsey D. Domar & Richard A. Musgrave, Proportional In-
come Taxation and Risk-Taking, 58 Q.J. Econ. 388, 389 (1944); Joseph E. Stiglitz, The
Effects of Income, Wealth, and Capital Gains Taxation on Risk-Taking, 83 Q.J. Econ. 263,
274 (1969); Louis Kaplow, Taxation and Risk Taking: A General Equilibrium Perspective,
47 Nat'l Tax J. 789 (1994); David F. Bradford, Fixing Realization Accounting: Symmetry,
Consistency and Correctness in the Taxation of Financial Instruments, 50 Tax L. Rev. 731,
763 (1995).
70 This is an application of a more general point: That inconsistencies will not necessa-
rily prompt planning, as long as the treatment of gains matches the treatment of losses. For
a fuller statement of this idea, and an associated reform proposal for financial instruments,
see David M. Schizer, Balance in the Taxation of Derivative Securities: An Agenda for
Reform, Colum. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2004) [hereinafter Balance].
71 .5($200) + .5(0) = $100. To avoid issues about timing and the time value of money, we
assume there is no delay in the receipt of either return.
72 For any tax rate T, .5[$200 - r ($200 - $100)] + .5[0 - T (0 - $100)] = $100 - r $50 + r
$50 = $100.
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instead of zero),73 leaving the same average value of $100.74 The same
analysis holds if Short is subject to a 35% tax rate. The taxpayer is
even worse off if the bet succeeds (with $165 instead of $185 under a
15% tax rate or $200 under a zero tax rate), but is even better off if
the bet fails (with $35 instead of $15 or zero). 75 Because of the higher
tax rate, Short offers less after-tax profit if the bet succeeds, but also
less after-tax loss if the bet fails. As a result, Short and Long have the
same value in this example, notwithstanding the difference in tax
rates. 76
Admittedly, the range of possible returns is different. The Long
can yield a profit of $85, while the Short can yield only $65. Yet this
brings us to the second reason why an investor might not mind a
higher tax rate. To cancel out their added tax burden, short sellers can
increase the size of their bet, and thus their range of returns. On these
facts, instead of betting $100, they can bet $130.77. After a 35% tax
on gains, this scaled-up bet yields an $85 profit or loss. 77 This obvi-
ously is the same after-tax loss as a $100 bet taxed at a 15% rate. If it
is costless to scale up shorts, the fact that the tax burden is higher
should not matter to the taxpayer.
2. Three Reasons Why the Higher Tax Rate Still Matters Here
Nevertheless, there are three reasons why the higher tax rate should
indeed matter, so that short sales are less attractive than longs. First,
the analysis above assumes that short sale losses are fully deductible,
so that generous treatment of short sale losses can offset ungenerous
treatment of short sale gains. The reality, however, is that the treat-
ment of losses from short sales is not necessarily more generous than
the treatment of losses from long positions. Second, even if short-sale
losses are treated favorably, taxpayers will not take full account of this
tax benefit for losses if they expect a profit, for instance, because they
73 The government bears $15 of the loss if the taxpayer deducts the loss and thus avoids
$15 of tax on $100 of other long-term capital gain.
74 .5[$200 - (.2)($200 - $100)] + .5[0 - (.2)(0 - $100)] = $100 - (.2)$50 + (.2)$50 = $100.
75 .50[$200 - (.35)($200 - $100)] + .50[0 - (.35)(0 - $100)] = $100 - (.35)$50 + (.35)$50 =
$100.
76 Ironically, a high tax rate can even be better if taxpayers can control the timing of
their tax. As a result, they can claim deductions currently while deferring the tax on gains
(thereby reducing its present value). In such strategic trading, the high tax rate raises the
value of the deductions, while deferral reduces the rate for gains (even if the rate is high in
nominal terms). As long as losses are fully deductible, then, strategic trading is more valu-
able when the tax rate is high. Jeff Strnad, Periodicity and Accretion Taxation: Norms and
Implementation, 99 Yale L.J. 1817, 1823-24 (1990).
77 If the bet wins, the taxpayer has $261.54 and a tax liability of $45.77 ((.35)($261.54 -
$130.77)), leaving $215.77, or a profit of $85. If the bet loses, he has a loss of $130.77 and a
tax deduction worth $45.77 ((.35)($130.77 - 0)), which yields a net loss of $85.
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have uncovered new information; in other words, even if tax rates do
not matter in equilibrium, they can matter in disequilibrium. Third,
scaling up is unlikely to be costless here. We discuss these points in
turn.
a. Reason #1: The Limited Tax Advantage of Short-Sale Losses
Is it safe to assume that losses from short sales are more valuable
than losses from long positions? The assumption is crucial because a
more valuable deduction for short-sale losses is needed to compen-
sate, ex ante, for the higher tax on short-sale profits. In general, a
deduction has value in sparing the taxpayer from tax on other income.
Losses from short sales would be more valuable if they offset high-tax
income and losses from long positions offset low-tax income.
At first blush, these conditions appear to hold: Losses from a "na-
ked" short sale are always short-term capital losses, regardless of how
long the short sale lasts, whereas losses from long positions are long-
term capital losses if the taxpayer holds the property for more than
one year. The advantage of short-term capital losses is that they auto-
matically can be used to offset short-term capital gains.
78
On closer inspection, though, it turns out that losses from short
sales are not always more valuable than losses from long positions.
For one thing, losses from long positions also can qualify as short-
term, provided that the taxpayer disposes of the depreciated position
before she has held it for a year. To be clear, this means that longs can
generate low-tax gains and also high-tax losses, a double benefit that
shorts can never match. Moreover, even if losses from a long position
are long-term (for instance, because the long does not decline in value
until after a year has past), these losses sometimes can still shelter
short-term capital gains. Gains and losses of a like character are first
netted against each other (for example, long-term loss against long-
term gain), and then any excess is netted against other types (for ex-
ample, long-term loss against short-term gain). If a taxpayer has only
short-term gains and only long-term losses, she can use these losses to
offset the short-term gains. In addition, sometimes short-term losses
are used to offset long-term gains-for instance, if the taxpayer does
not have any short-term gains. In other words, shorts can generate
high-tax gains and low-tax losses, a double burden that will not saddle
longs (at least if they last for more than one year). Finally, sometimes
78 For instance, assume a taxpayer has $100 of long-term capital gain (taxable at 15%)
and $100 of short-term capital gain (taxable at approximately 35%). If the taxpayer has
$100 of short-term capital loss, she can use it to avoid tax on the short-term gain (so the
losses are worth $35); in contrast, if the taxpayer has $100 of long-term capital loss, she can
use it only to avoid tax on the long-term capital gain (so the losses are worth $15).
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neither long- nor short-term losses can be used at all, for instance, if
taxpayers have no capital gain 79 or if the wash sale rules apply.80 The
bottom line is that losses from short sales are not always more valua-
ble than losses from long positions. As a result, the prospect of more
generous treatment of losses cannot wholly offset the prospect of less
generous treatment for short-sale gains.
b. Reason #2: The Importance of Tax Rates in Disequilibrium
Even assuming that losses from short sales were treated more favor-
ably than losses from long positions-and the preceding discussion
shows the limitations of this assumption-taxpayers still will discount
this tax advantage if they expect to have a gain instead of a loss, for
instance, because they have uncovered new information. In the above
example, the $100 market valuation of the Long and Short positions
reflects a 50:50 probability of yielding either $200 or zero. As noted
above, a taxpayer who agrees with this probability will value either
position at $100 even if different tax rates apply (and, of course, will
not trade in equilibrium). But if the taxpayer disagrees with the mar-
ket valuation-for instance, because she believes the probability of a
$200 payout is 60%, instead of 50%-then her expected profit from
trading (and thus her willingness to trade) obviously will vary with the
tax rate. A low tax rate leaves the taxpayer with a larger share of
gains and, in this state of disequilibrium, this factor matters more than
reducing the taxpayer's share of losses.
Unfortunately, the tax differential could prove more daunting to so-
phisticated traders than to unsophisticated ones. The extra tax on
profits presumably is most costly to well-informed traders, since they
have more reason to expect a profit and thus have less interest ex ante
in deducting losses.81 In other words, the tax constraint may have ex-
79 Under the capital loss limitations, individual taxpayers can deduct up to $3,000 of
capital loss from ordinary income, and must carry the rest forward to later tax years. IRC
§§ 1211(b), 1212(b).
80 The wash sale rules prevent taxpayers from claiming a deduction when they immedi-
ately reacquire the position (a sign that they are selling merely to claim the deduction).
IRC § 1091(a). These rules explicitly apply to short positions, IRC § 1091(e), although
their scope is somewhat narrower than when they apply to longs. For instance, the rule
arguably does not apply when a short sale is replaced with a put option, but it clearly
applies when a long is replaced with a call option. For a discussion, see David M. Schizer,
Scrubbing the Wash Sale Rules, Taxes 67 (2003); see also David M. Schizer, 184-4th: Taxa-
tion of Financial Instruments: Special Rules, Tax Mgmt. Portfolio (BNA) (forthcoming
2004).
81 The extra tax on profits also could discourage uninformed traders who are overconfi-
dent, perhaps as a result of a cognitive bias such as optimism bias. Chilling the enthusiasm
of these traders can be a useful contribution, although its value is undermined by the lack
of a corresponding check on overconfident longs.
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actly the wrong sorting effect, discouraging informed traders more
than it discourages uninformed ones.82
An example illustrates the effect on an informed trader in dise-
quilibrium. Assume there are two stocks, S1 and S2, and two risk-neu-
tral traders, a long buyer and a short seller. Each stock is trading at
$100 because each will yield either $200 or zero, and the market as-
signs a 50:50 probability to these scenarios. In equilibrium, neither
trader will trade these stocks because $100 is the correct price. In
disequilibrium, however, the long buyer might consider stock S1 to be
undervalued, while the short seller might consider stock S2 to be over-
valued. Assume the long buyer believes there is a 60% probability
that stock S will go to $200, and a 40% probability that it will go to
zero. Meanwhile, the short seller believes there is a 60% probability
that stock S2 will go to zero and a 40% probability that it will go to
$200. In buying S1, the long buyer expects pretax a profit of $20,83
and, in shorting S2, the short seller expects the same pretax profit.8 4
Yet their expected profits diverge if the tax rates are different (that is,
15% on longs and 35% on shorts). The long expects .85($20), or $17,
while the short seller expects .65($20), or $13. Appendix B offers a
more formal statement of this point.
c. Reason #3: Scaling Up Is Not Costless
In theory, short traders who expect a profit can offset the higher tax
rate on shorts by increasing the size of their bet, as noted above. This
does not remedy the disparity between longs and shorts because the
long trader also can scale up his position, and thus can earn still a
higher profit. At some point, the long and short will not be able to
increase the size of their bets (for example, due to credit constraints
and other transaction costs), and, for any given size, the long's bet will
be more profitable, ex ante.
In addition, scaling up can cancel out the tax differential only if it is
costless to increase the size of the bet. This seems especially unlikely
for short positions. For one thing, the tax differential described here
is not the only burden on short sellers. The various economic and
legal burdens on short selling are likely to become even more severe
82 This result is the opposite of the rosier scenario that Diamond and Verrecchia posit, in
which short sale constraints promote market efficiency if "a cost has the least effect on
those who have a strong desire to short for informational reasons." Diamond & Ver-
recchia, note 2, at 293. Of course, the deterrent effect on confident traders should not be
overstated. As long as the tax rate on gains is less than 100%, the after-tax return from a
successful short sale obviously is still positive (albeit less than the return on a correspond-
ingly successful long).
83 .6($100) - .4($100) = $20.
84 .6($100) - .4($100) = $20.
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as the scale of the bet increases. 85 More generally, short traders (by
definition) bet against long traders. Since the tax rate on the latter is
lower, they have less incentive to scale up, and thus are likely to
charge the short trader something extra for placing a bigger bet.86
C. Why the Higher Tax Rate on Short Sale Profits Could Prove
Unimportant: Avoidance by Sophisticated Taxpayers
Thus, notwithstanding the ability to deduct short sale losses and to
scale up, short sellers should still view the higher tax burden on short
sales as undesirable. Even so, there is another reason why this extra
tax burden might not matter: Sometimes traders can avoid it through
planning.
Most straightforwardly, the tax differential between longs and
shorts does not apply to three classes of investors and, to an extent,
these investors can counter the U.S. tax law's pro-long bias. Most im-
portantly, foreigners generally do not pay U.S. capital gains tax. As a
result, foreign trading firms can engage in information-based trading
that brings prices closer to fundamental value, without incurring extra
U.S. tax.8 7 Foreigners, however, are still likely to undersupply short
arbitrage because of economic costs described above, such as liquidity
constraints and the prospect of unlimited losses,88 as well as regulatory
and tax constraints in their home jurisdictions. Second, tax-exempt
entities such as pension funds and endowments pick up some of the
slack because they also do not pay U.S. tax on their trading activity.
Yet their contribution to tax arbitrage is limited because they typically
do not invest on their own. Instead, they usually invest with a mutual
or hedge fund, and tax considerations can affect these trading firms.8 9
Third, U.S. corporations are taxed at the same capital gains rate for
longs and shorts (generally 35%) because they are not eligible for a
reduced rate on long-term gain.90 Even so, a firm that engages solely
in trading (such as a hedge fund) will not organize as a U.S. corpora-
tion because profits will be taxed at both the entity and investor level.
Investment banks such as Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs organ-
85 Economic burdens on short selling are discussed above in Subsection 1I.A.4. Legal
burdens are discussed Section IV.
86 See Schizer, Balance, note 70.
87 Section 864 provides a safe harbor for non-U.S. traders who trade in the United
States. Passive investors are similarly protected. Foreign dealers must pay U.S. tax on
their U.S. activities but, as noted below, dealers generally are unaffected by the tax differ-
ential for a different reason. See note 91.
88 See supra text accompanying notes 29-32.
89 For instance, tax considerations can influence their managers, as discussed below. See
text accompanying notes 93-94.
90 IRC § 11.
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ize as U.S. corporations in order to list on the U.S. capital markets.
While these firms pay the same tax on shorts and longs,91 and have
trading desks that engage in arbitrage, they have other reasons not to
place too many short bets, including concerns about alienating CEOS,
and thus losing lucrative underwriting business. In sum, there are im-
portant market players who are immune to the rate differential be-
tween shorts and longs, and thus will supply some (but probably not
all) of the necessary arbitrage.
To be precise, the tax differential between longs and shorts affects
only individuals who pay U.S. tax, including wealthy individual inves-
tors, professional short sellers, and funds that invest for these individ-
uals, such as hedge funds. Obviously, retail investors also are affected.
At first blush, this group may seem unimportant because, in general,
they are unlikely to uncover new information. But retail investors
cannot be dismissed so easily, given their large numbers. By encour-
aging them to favor long positions, the rate differential should push
market prices upwards if more knowledgeable investors do not inter-
vene with short sales.
The rate differential also will discourage at least some of these in-
terventions-for instance, by professional traders such as hedge fund
managers. This is unfortunate because these knowledgeable and
highly motivated traders are well positioned to hunt for shaky finan-
cial statements or other evidence of overpricing. They also are more
independent, and thus are freer of conflicts, than traders at investment
banks.
To an extent, we can take comfort in the fact that these traders
sometimes ignore tax considerations (and thus might not be deterred
by the high tax burden on shorts), although it is hard to assess the
pervasiveness of this tax indifference. In some circumstances, fund
managers favor business considerations over tax planning. For in-
stance, arbitrageurs may face liquidity constraints that discourage
them from placing long-term bets. 92 This market failure may thin the
ranks of those who would be willing to engage in long-term short sales
even if the tax rate was favorable. At the margin, though, arbitrageurs
should be more willing to take long-term positions if the tax treatment
is favorable and, again, it is favorable only for longs, not for shorts.
Fund managers are more likely to consider tax implications-and,
in particular, the unfavorable treatment of short sales-if their own
compensation is implicated, as is the case with hedge fund managers.
The manager pays the same tax as investors pay (because the tax law
91 The trading desks of investment banks earn capital gain on shorts and longs, but their
securities dealer affiliates earn ordinary income on their dealing activity. IRC § 475.
92 See text accompanying note 31.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
[Vol. 57:
20041 MARKET BUBBLES AND WASTEFUL AVOIDANCE
views the manager as collecting a share of these investments, in effect
taxing her as an investor rather than as a wage earner).93 As a result,
a hedge fund manager can cut her tax in half by earning long-term
capital gains for investors.94
While it is likely that a large class of traders are at least somewhat
tax sensitive, there is a final reason why the rate differential between
longs and shorts may not matter: With careful structuring, well-ad-
vised traders who otherwise would earn short-term capital gain some-
times can earn long-term capital gain. We should not take too much
comfort in this avoidance, which is costly and can be a separate source
of social waste. For instance, buying a put option can yield long-term
capital gain, 95 although taxpayers must pay a premium for these op-
tions; while they can sell a call to fund the premium, any profit from
this short call is ineligible for long-term capital gain. Alternatively,
over-the-counter (OTC) forward contracts can yield long-term capital
gain on short positions if structured properly.96 Fees on these transac-
tions are large (for example, 1% of the notional amount per year),
expensive legal advice may be necessary, and these deals are not avail-
able to everyone; the commodities laws set minimum wealth require-
ments for them.97 While exchange-traded securities futures promise
93 Note that investor tax burdens do not affect the pretax amount of a hedge funds
manager's compensation, which typically is a share of the fund's pretax profit.
94 Mutual fund managers, in contrast, cannot cut their taxes in this way. Their fee typi-
cally is taxed as a wage (that is, at ordinary income rates). Yet the pretax amount of this
fee generally is a percentage of assets under management, an amount that reflects the
manager's reputation and past performance. While performance evaluations traditionally
have focused on pretax returns, recent changes in the securities laws require funds to dis-
close after-tax performance. Mitchell L. Engler, A Missing Piece to the Dividend Puzzle:
Agency Costs of Mutual Funds, 25 Cardozo L. Rev. 215 (2003); see text accompanying
note 118. This change should focus more attention on tax considerations. Even if the tax
law has not prevented mutual funds from selling short, they generally have been reluctant
to do so, at least as a historical matter. This may be a vestige of legal restrictions that no
longer are in effect. See Joseph Chen, Harrison Hong & Jeremy C. Stein, Breadth of Own-
ership and Stock Returns, 66 J. Fin. Econ. 171 (2002) (noting that 70% of mutual funds
explicitly state in filings with the SEC that short sales are not part of their investment
strategy, a step that legally prevents them from selling short).
95 See IRC § 1234(a)(1). The options dealer who sells this put option typically will
hedge by engaging in a short sale. Unlike individual taxpayers, dealers do not face differ-
ent tax treatment for longs and shorts. See note 91 and accompanying text.
96 OTC derivatives are available through dealers such as Goldman Sachs, instead of an
organized exchange. Long-term capital gain is most clearly available when the derivative is
terminated prior to its scheduled maturity date. IRC § 1234A. For a discussion, see N.Y.
St. Bar Ass'n, Tax Sec., Notional Principal Contract Character and Timing Issues, 79 Tax
Notes 1303 (June 8, 1998). In some cases, short equity swaps can also yield long-term
capital gains, although recent proposed regulations may narrow the circumstances in which
this can occur. See Prop. Treas. Reg. 1.446-3(g)(6), 69 Fed. Reg. 8886 (2004).
97 For small investors, these contracts potentially could be unenforceable under either
the federal commodities laws or state gambling laws. These results are expressly avoided
for a designated class of large investors, so-called "eligible contract participants," under the
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to be less expensive and more widely available, these short futures are
taxed like short sales, so that long-term capital gain rates never ap-
ply. 98 Indeed, it is unfortunate that Congress chose to extend the tax
differential to this new market. 99
D. Why the Higher Tax Rate on Short Sales Could Prove Useful
We have considered reasons why the rate differential between longs
and shorts may impede market efficiency, as well as reasons why it
may be unimportant. But are there ways in which the rate differential
could enhance efficiency? In particular, we turn now to traditional tax
policy explanations for the capital gains preference and ask whether
they apply to short sales.
1. An Incentive for Savings and Investment
One reason for the capital gains preference-to encourage investors
to provide investment capital to businesses-obviously does not apply
to short sales. Yet this rationale also does not apply to most longs.
Specifically, this justification extends only to the primary market-
that is, investors who buy securities directly from the issuer.100 Those
who buy stock in the secondary market do not directly supply capital
to firms. They play a different role-providing liquidity and policing
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763A
(codified as amended in various sections of 7 U.S.C.) (CFMA). For instance, individuals
must have at least $10 million of assets or, alternatively, $5 million if the derivative contract
will serve as a hedge. See generally CFMA, § 101, 114 Stat. 2763A-368 to -371, which adds
a definition of eligible contract participant to § la(12) of the Commodities Exchange Act.
7 U.S.C. § la(12).
98 IRC § 1234B(b) (if gain or loss from "the sale, exchange, or termination of a securi-
ties futures contract to sell property" is treated as capital gain or loss, such gain or loss is
short-term). Alternatively, there is some authority that cash-settled short sales are taxed at
long-term capital gains rates, although the authority is old and of uncertain reliability. Our
sense is that this strategy is not commonly used. For a discussion, see N.Y. St. Bar Ass'n,
Tax Sec., Comments on H.R. 3170 (July 14, 1998), 98 TNT 136-38, July 16, 1998, available
in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File; see also I.T. 3721, 1945 C.B. 164 (gain on the assignment of a
contract to sell stock on a "when-issued" basis is long-term if the contract has been held for
the long-term holding period); cf. Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. United States, 601 F.2d 540,
548-51 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (holding that assignment of the contract to sell British pounds to a
third party in exchange for cash produced long-term capital gain not subject to § 1233(b));
The Carborundum Co. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 730 (1980) (holding for taxpayer on facts
similar to those of American Home Products Corp.), acq. 1984-2 C.B. 1.
99 Congress authorized this market in December 2000 and it began trading in 2002.
Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 401(a), 114 Stat.
2763A-587, 2763A-648 to-651.
100 In fact, Congress has provided a separate tax preference for those who invest directly
in certain new ventures. See IRC § 1202 (providing a partial exclusion for gains from cer-
tain small business stock).
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the accuracy of prices-and short sellers contribute equally to these
functions.
A more persuasive rationale to favor longs is to encourage savings.
In purchasing securities, taxpayers typically part with their money and
thus defer consumption, something a short seller (theoretically) does
not have to do. This difference could plausibly justify the rate differ-
ential between longs and shorts. Even if a savings incentive is advisa-
ble-a question we do not address here-the existing rate distinction
between longs and shorts is a poorly tailored response. For example,
longs are taxed favorably even if a full prepayment is not needed, as in
a long forward contract or securities future'01 or in an investment fi-
nanced by borrowing. Nor does a lender enjoy a favorable tax rate for
interest income, even though bonds are an important savings vehicle.
2. A Response to Tax Planning
A second reason to tax short sales less favorably is to discourage
taxpayers from using them in wasteful tax planning. Two strategies
come to mind, but the rate differential is not an effective response.
First, taxpayers might try to "age" appreciated longs that have not
been held for a full year. For instance, assume a taxpayer buys stock
that immediately appreciates. If she sells it a month later, the gain is
short-term. What if, instead, she shorts the stock-a position that per-
fectly hedges the stock she owns-but does not actually sell the appre-
ciated stock until a year later? The government will not want to allow
the preference here because the stock has been hedged for all but one
month.'02 The current rule denying the preference is far broader than
necessary: In general, taxpayers never earn long-term capital gain on
101 A securities future is a publicly traded forward contract. In a forward contract, the
"long" puts no money down (other than collateral) and commits to buy the property in the
future for a fixed price. If the underlying property appreciates, the investor can terminate
the contract at a profit without ever paying for the underlying property. For instance, the
investor might commit to pay $109 in two years for a share of XYZ, which is currently
trading at $100. If XYZ appreciates to $119, the investor can terminate the contract, re-
ceiving $10. Even though the investor puts no money down, he earns $10 of long-term
capital gain if he holds the contract for a year before terminating it. See IRC § 1234A
(governing gains or losses from the "cancellation, lapse, expiration or other termination"
of over-the-counter forward contracts); § 1234B (governing gains or losses from the "sale,
exchange or termination" of securities futures contracts).
102 The assumption here is that the government wishes to reward only long-term eco-
nomic exposure, as opposed to mere formal ownership. While there is room to question
this objective, and it is not our purpose here to defend it, one reason for such a policy
preference would be to encourage long-term shareholder monitoring of management,
which in turn might lead to better corporate governance, more accurate market pricing,
and other positive externalities.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
2004]
TAX LAW REVIEW
short sales. 10 3 The policy objective here-not allowing holding period
to accrue on hedged positions-obviously could be achieved while still
allowing long-term treatment to short sales that are not part of a
hedge.
A second planning strategy is to simulate a "tax-free" sale of appre-
ciated assets. In a short sale against the box, the short sale hedges an
appreciated asset, yielding sale proceeds and insulating the taxpayer
from changes in the asset's value. 10 4 Since the taxpayer's goal is to
simulate a sale while deferring tax, the logical response is to tax short
sales against the box as sales, as a 1997 reform requires.10 5 There is no
need to apply a higher tax rate to every short sale, including one that
is not part of a hedge. 10 6
3. A Second-Best Response to Other Tax Distortions
The tax rate for longs may be lower than the rate for shorts for still
another reason. Perhaps our purpose in cutting the rate for longs does
not apply to shorts. Two traditional tax policy rationales for the capi-
tal gains preference should be considered. First, the preference might
correct for the double taxation of corporate profits. This rationale is
not persuasive for short sellers-and so a rate differential might be
justified -since shorts typically appreciate when the firm is not profit-
able. This justification for a rate differential is unpersuasive for three
reasons. First, a capital gains preference obviously is a much less ef-
fective remedy for double taxation than comprehensive integration of
corporate and personal taxation. Second, the preference applies to
assets that are not subject to double taxation, such as real estate and
foreign corporations. Third, even if the main purpose of the prefer-
ence is to alleviate double taxation, we may still want to extend it to
103 There is an exception for taxpayers who cover the short with property they held for
more than one year before initiating the short sale. Reg. § 1.1233-1(a)(3); Reg. § 1.1233-
1(c)(6) (Ex. 6). Otherwise, holding period is lost, and not merely suspended. Reg.
§ 1.1233-1(c)(2) (Rule 2). For instance, assume a taxpayer buys the stock on January 1,
2004, shorts the stock on December 1, 2004, and closes the short sale the next day, Decem-
ber 2, with newly acquired stock. Even though the stock was held for 11 months before the
short sale, the taxpayer loses all of the holding period, and must hold the stock unhedged
for 12 additional months in order to qualify for the reduced tax rate. Reg. § 1.1233-1(c)(6)
(Ex. 2).
104 For example, if the short is established at $100 and the stock drops to $60, the seller
can cover by delivering the stock and, in essence, has sold shares at $100. The margin rules
are more generous to short sales against the box than to naked short sales, allowing with-
drawal of 95% of the proceeds. See Schizer, Frictions, note 9, at 1398-403.
105 IRC § 1259. For a discussion, see Schizer, Frictions, note 9, at 1398-403; David M.
Schizer, Hedging Under Section 1259, 80 Tax Notes 345 (July 20, 1998).
106 The higher tax rate is also not an effective response to tax-free hedging. The higher
tax rate does not apply if the appreciated asset has been held for at least a year before the
short sale is initiated. Reg. § 1.1233-1(a)(3); Reg. § 1.1233-1(c)(6) (Ex. 3).
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short sales in order to prevent other distortions, such as upward price
pressure deriving from short-specific constraints. 10 7
A second rationale for the capital gains preference that could apply
only to longs is inflation. By not increasing tax basis to account for
inflation, our system overstates (and thus overtaxes) profits on longs;
reducing the tax rate on longs may alleviate this concern. Of course,
the best solution for this problem is to index the system for inflation,
not to provide a reduced rate on a subset of profits. But assuming this
superior solution is unavailable, does the inflation rationale for a re-
duced rate also apply to short sales? If not, it may be appropriate to
tax shorts and longs at different rates. The question, then, is whether
inflation causes short sales to be overtaxed. At first blush, the answer
seems to be "no." Indeed, short sellers could be undertaxed if they
received short sale proceeds upon executing the short sale; they would
receive more valuable dollars at an earlier time, while spending less
valuable dollars at a later time to cover the short. Since short sellers
cannot access proceeds,108 however, inflation typically hurts them.
Short sellers who do not earn a return on these proceeds get no com-
pensation for inflation (and, while they may not be overtaxed, this is
not terribly comforting). Those who do get a return are compensated
for inflation, but this rebate is taxable in full without any adjustment
for inflation.10 9
E. Assessment
In sum, all secondary market trading, whether long or short, should
be subject to the same tax rates and holding period rules. If a reduced
capital gains rate applies to longs (and we take no position about
whether it should), the preference also should apply to shorts. Even
without this formal parity, there is some comfort in the fact that many
traders are indifferent to U.S. tax rules, while others can use self-help.
Yet this avoidance is not available to all taxpayers, and avoidance
costs can be a separate source of waste. Instead of relying on self-
help, we should reform the rule.
107 Indeed, an argument might be made that these distortions justify a lower tax on
shorts than on longs, not just parity between the two. We are reluctant to propose this
more extreme response because of the difficult empirical judgments required in alleviating
one regulatory distortion by creating another.
108 See notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
109 Another traditional rationale for the capital gains preference is lock-in. The concern
is that, in order to defer their tax liability, taxpayers keep appreciated positions that they
no longer want (that is, because tax is not due until they sell the position). The lower the
tax rate, the less daunting is the toll charge for disposing of the position. While this con-
cern is a plausible rationale for a capital gains preference, it applies equally to long and
short positions. For either one, taxpayers can defer the tax by retaining the position.
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IV. OTHER LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON SHORT SALES
While our primary focus is on the tax rule, which other commenta-
tors have neglected, we also offer a brief discussion of two other short-
specific constraints: the uptick rule and the locate requirement. 110
We explore the same two themes that we developed above. First, is
the constraint narrowly tailored to preventing panics and market ma-
nipulation? Second, is it easy to avoid? We find that the tailoring of
these proposals, while inadequate, is somewhat better than that of the
tax constraint-and not surprisingly since, unlike the tax rule, these
actually were intended as financial market regulation. We also sug-
gest that avoidance here is relatively easy, though it still imposes
wasteful costs.
A. UpTick Rule
The uptick test limits short sales in a falling market. Short sales are
permitted only (1) at a price higher than the previous price (an "up-
tick"), or (2) at the previous price if the last different price was lower
(a "zero-plus tick"). Obviously, there is no corresponding ban on bids
in a rising market. While the SEC rule applies only to exchange-listed
stocks (whether traded on exchanges or over-the-counter), NASDAQ
secured SEC approval in 1994 for a similar rule for over-the-counter
securities."'
110 Two other context-specific constraints are not considered here. First, it is illegal to
cover certain short sales with stock received in a public offering. See Rule 105 of Regula-
tion M, 17 C.F.R. § 242.105 (2004) under the Securities Act (prohibiting any person from
covering a short sale "with offered securities from an underwriter or broker or dealer par-
ticipating in the offering, if such short sale occurred" after a registration statement was
filed and during the five business days before pricing). Second, Rule 14e-4 bans the tender
of borrowed shares in a tender offer. Regulation 14E, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-4 (2004).
111 Section 10(a) of the Exchange Act gives the SEC authority to regulate short sales. 15
U.S.C. § 78j(a) (2003). After the market break of 1937, the SEC adopted the tick test in
Rule 10a-1. See Exchange Act Release No. 1,548, 3 Fed. Reg. 213 (Jan. 26, 1938); Ex-
change Act Release No. 13,091, 41 Fed. Reg. 56,530 (Dec. 28, 1976) (describing the pur-
poses of Rule 10a-1); see also Exchange Act Release No. 34,277, 59 Fed. Reg. 34,885 (July
7, 1994) (approving NASD Rule 3350); Exchange Act Release No. 44,030, 66 Fed. Reg.
14,235 (Mar. 9, 2001) (modifying NASDAQ tick test to take account of decimalization).
These rules are policed and supplemented via disclosure. Short sellers are required to
designate their orders as "short" (that is, each sale "ticket" is supposed to be labeled short
or long), see Rule 10a-1(c), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10a-1(c) (2004), and also make periodic disclo-
sure of the size of their uncovered short positions. See NYSE Rule 421, 2 New York Stock
Exchange Guide (CCH) 2421, at 3724 (June 2002) (requiring "[m]ember organizations
and individual direct clearing members for which the Exchange is the designated examining
authority" to report short positions); NASD Rule 3360(a), NASD Securities Dealers Man-
ual (CCH) 4960 (2003) (requiring the regular reporting by each member of short positions
in certain "customer and proprietary firm accounts").
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1. Tailoring
To an extent, the uptick rule is meant to address the concerns, dis-
cussed above, about using short sales to manipulate the market and to
intensify a panic. Yet the rule is both over- and under-inclusive. It
applies even if the stock is up for the day, as long as the current price
is lower than the previous one. The rule applies not only to large posi-
tions that can move the market, but also to small positions. Similarly,
it applies to liquid as well as illiquid stocks.
In some cases, moreover, the rule may fail to stop short sales that
should be stopped. For instance, someone bent on manipulating the
market might be happy to trade 100 shares on an uptick (or to invite a
friend to do so), as a prelude to shorting one million shares in an ef-
fort to precipitate a panic. As a practical matter, the government is
unlikely to detect such behavior. Even without such manipulation,
moreover, the tick test has less bite now that share prices are quoted
in pennies, instead of in eighths. 112 In short, the rule is not well
tailored.
2. Avoidance
This poor tailoring is less harmful because the tick test is easy to
avoid, although, again, self-help can be a separate source of social
waste. Well-advised investors sometimes can take advantage of the
test's exceptions-for instance, for market professionals engaged in
certain arbitrage transactions, block trades or, in the case of the NAS-
DAQ rule, market-making.113 In addition, the tick test does not apply
to a sale if the seller is "net long"-that is, if the seller has more long
positions than shorts (for example, by owning shares or holding deriv-
ative positions that count as ownership). Yet the regulation's mallea-
ble definition of net long-and, in particular, the treatment of
derivatives-sometimes allows for avoidance. For example, a trader
might enter into a forward contract to purchase the stock-a step that
112 The SEC has raised this issue in a 2001 concept release about the effects of "decimal-
ization." See Exchange Act Release No. 44,568, 66 Fed. Reg. 38,390, 38,394 (July 24, 2001)
("transactions based on very small price changes could undermine the operation of short
sale regulation").
113 See, e.g., Exchange Act Release No. 29,237, 56 Fed. Reg. 24, 853 (May 31, 1991)
(exemption for off hours trading); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., SEC No-
Action Letter, 1986 WL 67504, at *5 (Dec. 17, 1986) (relief from tick test for index arbi-
trage); NASD Rule 3350(c), NASD Securities Dealers Manual (CCH) 4953-54 (2003) (ex-
empting market makers). See generally Rule lOa-l(e), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10a-l(e) (2004)
(listing exemptions); Steven Lofchie, A Guide to Broker-Dealer Regulation 303-06 (2000)
(describing various exceptions).
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counts as a long-even if no purchase price is specified, and so this
long does not expose the trader to changes in the stock price. 14
Nor does the tick test apply in the options markets. The test gener-
ally also does not govern equity swaps and other OTC derivatives.
Finally, investors often avoid the rule by booking short sales offshore
(that is, when the U.S. markets are closed), although the legal basis
for this strategy might be questioned. 115 Given these limitations, as
well as empirical studies casting doubt on the rule's effectiveness, 116
the SEC has at times proposed to repeal or revise the tick test, includ-
ing most recently in October 1999.117 We recommend repealing this
rule.
2. Locate Requirement
Finally, a third short-specific constraint is the need for short sellers
to borrow the stock-and, relatedly, the "recall" risk of having to re-
turn the stock before they want to close their shorts. Short sellers
generally cannot engage in "naked shorts," in which they bet against a
stock without actually delivering shares. To borrow stock, the short
seller will have to pay a fee, a cost that can surge unexpectedly when
demand outstrips the supply of readily borrowed stock in a "short
squeeze. '"118 The difficulty of borrowing stock during a bubble is well
114 Although the SEC proposed a rule to foreclose this strategy, see Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 30,772, 57 Fed. Reg. 24,415 (June 9, 1992), this amendment has not been adopted.
See Lofchie, note 113, at 300.
115 The SEC has noted that "a portion of foreign trading in U.S. equities by U.S. broker-
dealers or institutions is done to avoid off-board trading restrictions, transparency stan-
dards in the U.S. markets . . . and other rules, such as the Commission's short sale rule."
Exchange Act Release No. 30,920, 57 Fed. Reg. 32,587, 32,592 (July 22, 1992); see also
H.R. Rep. No. 102-414, at 6 (1991) ("evasion of the [tick test] is possible, especially
through overseas trading"). The SEC has noted that the rule does not contain any express
exemption for overseas transactions. Exchange Act Release No. 21,958, 50 Fed. Reg.
16,302 (Apr. 25, 1985).
116 See, e.g., Irving M. Pollack, Short-Sale Regulations of NASDAQ Securities (1986)
(study commissioned by NASDAQ that recommends against implementing tick test).
117 Exchange Act Release No. 42,037, 64 Fed. Reg. 57,996 (Oct. 28, 1999) (seeking com-
ments about continued viability of tick test). In 1976, the SEC proposed to eliminate the
tick test, but was persuaded not to do so by opposition from CEOs. See Lofchie, note 113,
at 306 ("[T]he continuance of the Uptick Rules has been strongly supported by securities
issuers who assert that so-called "'bear raids'--the spreading of false negative rumors
about an issuer combined with short selling of an issuer's stock-are a significant prob-
lem.") (emphasis deleted).
118 Under SEC Rule 15c3-3, stock is most readily borrowed from brokers who hold cus-
tomer stock in margin accounts. See H.R. Rep. No. 102-414, note 115, at 6. Thus, short
squeezes are most likely for stock that is commonly held by investors in physical form or in
cash accounts. The phenomenon is also especially likely for small stock offerings. Cf. Pol-
lack, note 116, at 6 ("[W]hen extensive short selling occurs, stock is not readily available
and sometimes cannot be borrowed at all."). While the cost of borrowing stock is usually
less than 1% per year, this cost can surge during a squeeze. D'Avolio, note 6, at 273 (using
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documented, for instance, with Amazon.com, 119 although there also is
empirical evidence that stock borrowing fees often are manageable. 120
In any event, recent tax legislation is likely to increase the cost of bor-
rowing stock.12' The need to borrow shares can prevent an investor
from even offering to make a short sale, since such offers can be made
only after a source of borrowed shares has been identified (the locate
requirement). 22  In contrast, no corresponding constraint binds
would-be buyers who wish to place a bid.
4. Tailoring
The locate requirement serves, in a modest way, to limit manipula-
tion and panics. Since the investor's broker must locate the stock
before the investor can offer to sell short, flooding the market with
such sell orders is not a costless step. But obviously, this rule can con-
strain short sales that are not manipulative and can fuel speculative
bubbles123-facts that counsel in favor of abandoning the test.
18 months of data from a large financial institution, from April 2000 through September
2001, to show that the value-weighted cost to borrow the sample loan portfolio is 25 basis
points per annum and 91% of stocks in the sample could be borrowed for less than 1% per
year, but the fees in the other 9% average 4.3% per year; showing also that fees rise, and
squeezes are most likely, for stocks that are the subject of the most divergent opinion and
thus are most appealing candidates for short sales).
119 See, e.g., Dechow et al., note 11, at 4 n.2; see also D'Avolio, note 6, at 272 (finding
that while borrowing fees "might be small on average, they are systematically high when
differences of opinion are high"); Mitchell et al., note 31 (offering data about stocks with
negative short rebates during the period from October 1999 to October 2000, including
Stratos Lighttwave).
120 See Christopher C. Geczy, David K. Musto & Adam V. Reed, Stocks Are Special
Too: An Analysis of the Equity Lending Market, 66 J. Fin. Econ. 241 (2002) (using data
from stock lender to show that the cost of borrowing stock is not sufficient to render vari-
ous arbitrage strategies unprofitable, including long-short trading, shorting IPOs, and
shorting Internet stocks, though this borrowing cost may be adequate to render merger
arbitrage unprofitable).
121 Congress recently applied the long-term capital gains rate to certain dividends. Jobs
and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, § 302, 117 Stat. 752,
760-64. Yet the 15% rate applies only to the dividend, and not to a substitute payment
from someone who has borrowed stock. Thus, taxable investors will not want to lend their
shares when a dividend is about to be paid.
122 For a description of the process of locating stock, see Darrell Duffie, Nicolae Garle-
anu & Lasse Heje Pedersen, Securities Lending, Shorting, and Price, 66 J. Fin. Econ. 307
(2002).
123 See Duffie et al., note 122 (offering model in which need to borrow stock increases
return earned by stock lenders, and this extra return increases the stock lender's valuation
of stock, which in turn can increase market price of stock, thereby intensifying a bubble).
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2. Avoidance
As with other short-specific constraints, well-advised investors
sometimes can avoid the locate requirement. 124 Again, though, this
self-help itself can be a separate source of social waste. For instance,
to avoid the rule, investors can enter into "short" swaps or other OTC
derivative contracts (although they incur extra fees to do so). Since
these short positions are settled in cash, there is no practical need or
legal requirement to locate the stock. While the counterparty on such
contracts, the derivatives dealer, may engage in short sales (for exam-
ple, to hedge their "long" position on the derivative), market makers
generally are exempt from the locate requirement.1 25 In addition,
other players at times may fail to comply.126 Given these problems
with the current rule, we would repeal it. To mitigate any concerns
that short sellers would misuse a naked short, we would require them
to post cash collateral equal to 150% of their liability, a step that al-
ready is required for most market actors.127
V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND A DISCLOSURE ALTERNATIVE
In general, the law should treat all secondary market trading-
whether long or short-as contributing equally to the ability of indi-
viduals to optimize their portfolios, as well as to the liquidity and the
accuracy of market pricing. As a result, the same tax rules generally
should apply to long and short positions, and the uptick rule and lo-
cate requirement should be repealed.
We have acknowledged that market manipulation and noise traders
offer a rationale for regulating both shorts and longs. While this prob-
lem is not the focus of this Article, we offer a few tentative sugges-
tions. First, existing limitations on fraudulent misstatements are still
needed to keep investors from shorting (or buying) and then spread-
ing false rumors to influence the price. At the same time, other safe-
124 After all, the same share can be lent and sold many times, at least in theory, such that
one share can be shorted repeatedly.
125 See NYSE Rule 440C, 2 New York Stock Exchange Guide (CCH) j 2440C.10, at
3795-3 (2002) (requiring all members and member organizations to engage in diligent ef-
forts to "borrow the necessary securities to make delivery"); NASD Rule 3370(b)(2)(B),
NASD Securities Dealers Manual (CCH) 4961 (2003). At one point, short sales for non-
member broker-dealers were not covered by this requirement, but the NASD has recently
filled this gap. See NASD Notice to Members 04-03 (Jan. 2004).
126 Commentators have emphasized the lack of an effective sanction on broker-dealers
who fail to deliver securities in making a short sale. The National Securities Clearing Cor-
poration, which administers such settlements, will keep a record of what the dealer owes
but will not require delivery. Nor will a customer who has purchased the securities through
a broker necessarily know that securities have never been delivered. See generally Pollack,
note 116, at 50-51.
127 See note 9.
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guards may address the separate manipulation concern discussed
above: the ability of a large short sale, by itself, to depress the price
and prompt momentum traders to sell. For one thing, this concern
does not arise for smaller trades, so a legal constraint is needed only
for short sales that are large enough to move the market.
For these large positions, one response is to require disclosure. For
example, anyone shorting more than a minimum percentage of shares
could be forced to disclose, in a statement issued within a brief time
period after the short sale, information including (1) the fact of the
trade, (2) their identity, and (3) their reason for shorting the stock.128
Other market participants could then assess whether the short sale
derives from a desire to manipulate prices, or from solid informa-
tion. 129 In the latter case, others would follow the short seller's lead
but a decline in the market price would be socially desirable. 130
There remains the other concern described above: If unsophistica-
ted noise or momentum traders are allowed to engage in short sales
without limitation, they may be more likely (without any manipulative
intent) to precipitate or intensify a panic. Of course, it is not clear
that the existing constraints on short sales really mitigate this risk,
since, as noted above, these constraints can be avoided in many cases.
Nor is it clear that panics are more damaging to the economy than
bubbles-in fact, bubbles may well cause more lasting effects.' 3' In
any event, the best antidote to speculative panics may not be a more
finely tailored short-sale constraint, but a market with full disclo-
sure.132 In such an environment, sophisticated investors should be
more comfortable betting against the noise traders, thereby containing
the panic.
128 Disclosure after the short sale is preferable to disclosure before the short sale be-
cause, in the latter case, the short seller will have to give away valuable information and
analysis before placing himself in a position to capitalize on this disclosure, a step that
obviously could undermine incentives to engage in such analysis.
129 While there is a risk that disclosure statements themselves could be used to manipu-
late the market, such manipulations should not be effective once a trader develops a repu-
tation for manipulative disclosure.
130 Obviously, in applying the minimum size requirement, a series of roughly contempo-
raneous short sales would need to be aggregated, as would the short sales of certain related
parties. Likewise, if the short seller is a corporation, it may be necessary, in some cases, to
require disclosure of the corporation's owners. These and other details of implementation
are beyond the scope of this Article.
131 We thank Zohar Goshen for this observation.
132 Our premise is that the law should safeguard the integrity of the market, but should
not necessarily protect each investor from placing foolish bets.




Information is the lifeblood of financial markets. Likewise, arbi-
trage is essential in policing market prices and in countering the effect
of noise traders. Unfortunately, arbitrage is an economically fragile
phenomenon because arbitrageurs face liquidity constraints, as well as
the potential for unlimited risk when they sell short. We should not
compound these economic burdens with unnecessary legal burdens on
arbitrage and short sales. On the contrary, legal rules should nurture
the dynamic processes that develop and incorporate information into
market prices. Short-sale regulations under current law fail this test.
In some cases, creative advisors have found ways to plan around these
rules. We should eliminate the need for this imperfect and wasteful
self-help. Our law should recognize the legitimate-indeed, neces-
sary-role of short sales.
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APPENDIX A
The role of short sales in preventing bubbles can be presented for-
mally. The intuition is that well-informed expert traders use short
sales to trade against unsophisticated momentum traders, who buy
merely because the price has just risen; as long as enough experts
trade, the price remains at the correct (fundamentals-based) level.
Consider a simple market with n homogeneous "expert" (fundamen-
tal) traders and fi homogeneous "momentum" (second-order price-
tracking) traders. Let V, = V denote a stock's perceived value at time t
by one of the expert traders, where it is assumed that each expert is
given some private "information" about the value of the stock
through the parameter p. Furthermore, let IV, = Pt-1 + y (Pt-1 - Pt-2)
denote a stock's perceived value at time t by one of the momentum
traders, where the constant y > 0 governs the sensitivity of the mo-
mentum traders to recent price changes. Finally, let the market price
of one share at time t be described by the simple weighted average Pt
= [3V, + (1 - [3) iv,, where
3 n E [0,1]
n +n
denotes the "expert ratio. '133
Rewriting the market price as Pt = 13p + (1 - 13)[(1 + y)Pt 1 - yPt-2], it
is easy to show that this nonhomogeneous second-order difference
equation possesses a general solution of the form P, = CImIt + C2m2' +
p, where
ml = '[(1--f)(l+y) + q(1--3)2(1+y) 2-4(1-P3)y ],
m2 = 1[(1-[3)(1+y) - ](1-3)2(1+y) 2-4(1--P)y ],
and the constants C1 and C2 are determined by the initial values P0 =
Po and P1 = [3p + (1 - [3) f17. Checking various conditions on the (pos-
sibly complex) characteristic roots ml and M 2, it is straightforward to
show that 1m, 11 < 1 and 1rM2 11 < 1 if
133 Although the market price is modeled as a weighted average of V, and 7, this does
not imply that price is determined as an average of all of the bids made by the various
traders. Each trader (expert or momentum) can move in or out of the market whenever he
chooses, and price is determined by the actions of individual traders on the margin. In
essence, V, is the marginally determined price in a market with only expert traders, and 9,
is the marginally determined price in a market with only momentum traders. We assume
that, descriptively, the marginally determined price in our composite market may be ex-
pressed as a weighted average of these two marginally determined prices.
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Thus, regardless of the initial prices Po and P 1, the market price will
converge to P_ = p as long as the "expert ratio" is sufficiently large in
comparison to the sensitivity parameter y. Path B of Figure 1 illus-
trates how a sufficient number of expert traders can prevent a price
bubble (that is, Path A) by selling short at time t = 2.
FIGURE 1
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APPENDIX B
We argued in Section III.B.2.b that taxes have a significant impact
in disequilibrium. This Appendix makes the point more formally.
The intuition is that, if profits from short sales are taxed at a higher
rate than profits from long positions, optimists are more likely to
trade than pessimists, and so prices rise. Assume that a share of stock
can take on either of two values, $200 or zero. Assume also that there
are two types of traders, and both types are risk neutral: optimists
(long buyers) and pessimists (short sellers). The optimists believe that
Pr{share = $200} = PB and the pessimists believe that Pr{share = $2001
= Ps, where PB > Ps. Assume that there are equal numbers of optimists
and pessimists with access to the market (nB = ns), but not all are
willing to trade at any given time. Let NB -< nB denote the number of
optimists that are willing to trade, and let Ns <- ns denote the number
of pessimists willing to trade. The proportion of optimists that trade is
given by
NB
- NB + Ns'




(1) the prevailing price in the market is set as the weighted average of
the certainty equivalents (under linear utility),1 34
P = wp(200PB) + (1 - wc)(200ps); (A)
and
(2) the ratio of proportions,
w, _ NB
1-wa Ns
is given by the ratio of the buyers' net after-tax expected gain to the
sellers' net after-tax expected gain; that is,
(Jp - [PB(200-P)-(1-PB)P](1-TB) (B)
1-WB [ps(P-200)+(1-ps)P](1--rs)
Solving equations (A) and (B) simultaneously yields
(P-200ps)2  1-TB
(200pB-P)2  1-Ts'
134 For a discussion of the role of the weighted average in setting price in our model, see
note 133.
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from which it in turn follows that
1 (200pB-P)3





Therefore, (1) the market price decreases as the tax rate on long
positions increases, and (2) the market price increases as the tax rate
on short positions increases. Both of these results are anticipated by
intuition.
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